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The Problem of Social Cost
In a Genetically Modified Age
PAUL J. HEALD* AND JAMES CHARLES SMITH**
INTRODUCTION
One fundamental impetus for the development of modern law stems
from the need to settle disputes between neighbors. Indeed, the focus of
the most-cited article in law review history,' Ronald Coase's The
Problem of Social Cost,2 is firmly on the issue of how the law should deal
with someone who interferes with the use of a neighbor's property. The
myriad of uses to which Coase's analysis has been put over the last forty
years3 has obscured the relatively straightforward nature of the question
that interested him: Should the law force an entity to bear the full cost of
its behavior? When one neighbor harms another, should the law impose
liability in the form of a damages action, or in the form of a tax (as
suggested famously by Pigou4), or, perhaps, do nothing at all?
The original conundrum contemplated by Coase arises with
spectacular clarity in the context of the emerging problem of pollen drift.
* Allen Post Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
** John Byrd Martin Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
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I. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHn.-KEN'r L. REV. 751,
767 (996).
2. R.H. COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. I (196o), reprinted in THE FIRM, THE
MARKET, AND THE LAW 95 (1988).
3. See, e.g., David Dudley, The Coase Theorem as Applied to Trade Barriers and Optimal
Adjustment Strategies, 19 U. PA. J. INr'L ECON. L. 1029 (1998); Paul E. McGreal & DeeDee Baba,
Applying Coase to Qui Tam Actions Against the States, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 87 (2001). Westlaw
currently retrieves seventy-one law documents in its law journal database (JLR) that contain the
words "Coase" or "Coasean" in their titles.
4. See A.C. PIGOu, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 127-30 (4th ed. 1932).
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Genetically modified (GMO) crops constitute a significant segment of
agricultural production, and pollen from these crops drifts inexorably
across property lines.' Consider the situation faced by farmers in the
United States who grow non-genetically modified (non-GMO) crops for
buyers in jurisdictions that heavily regulate or forbid the sale of
genetically modified food products, like the European Union or Japan,
or who sell to purveyors of organic food products in the United States or
elsewhere. The market for non-GMO crops is enormous,6 and such goods
often command a premium price,7 but due to the widespread planting of
GMO crops,8 non-GMO farmers run the constant risk of contamination
by pollen from patented genetically modified plants.9 If a farmer has a
forward contract for non-GMO corn for sale in Europe, and her corn
fields are pollinated by a neighbor's genetically modified crop, then the
anticipated premium"0 from selling the non-GMO crop will be lost. More
5. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part II.B. Japan and the European Union are two obvious markets, but even large
American buyers, like Gerber baby foods, are going non-GMO. See Drew L. Kershen, The Risks of
Going Non-GMO, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 631, 633 (2000) ("In September 1999, Gerber announced that its
baby food products would no longer use any ingredients from genetically modified crops."); see also
Frito Lay Asks Farmers Not to Grow Altered Corn: Firm Playing it Safe Despite FDA Assurances,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 28, 2000, at i iD ("Snack maker Frito-Lay Inc. has asked its hundreds of
contract farmers to grow corn that has not been genetically modified in case U.S. consumers shun
bioengineered foods.").
7. See INT'L TRADE CTR., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WORLD MARKETS FOR
ORGANIC FRUIT AND VEGETABLES 215 (2ooI) (premium for organic produce in conventional stores in
the United States ranges from i 1% to 121 %); Carie-Megan Flood, Pollen Drift and Potential Causes of
Action, 28 J. CORP. L. 473. 474 (2003) (noting price of organic corn at $4 per bushel, while genetically
modified corn sold for $1.67); Stephen M. Scanlon, Comment, Should Missouri Farmers of Genetically
Modified Crops Be Held Liable for Genetic Drift and Cross-Pollination?, Io Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. I, I (2002) ("Farmers who cultivate organic crops stand to earn a substantial premium in these
markets if their crops can pass a rigorous testing procedure for GMOs. It is this market premium
available on organic crops that makes the concept of 'pollen drift' such a significant threat to organic
farmers.").
8. See CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, MONSANTO VS. U.S. FARMERS 8-9 (2005) (noting that in 2004, GMO
crops made up 85% of the United States soy acreage, 45% of the corn acreage, and 76% of the cotton
acreage; in 2003, they composed 84% of the canola acreage).
9. See Margaret Rosso Grossman, Biotechnology, Property Rights and the Environment, 50 AM.
J. COMP. L. SuPP. 215, 229 (2002).
One incident of cross-pollination involved Bt corn, cultivated in Texas, that contaminated
the fields of a certified organic farmer. Terra Prima, a Wisconsin food processing company,
had used the organic farmer's corn to make organic tortilla chips, which were shipped to
Europe. DNA testing revealed traces of Bt corn, and the food company had to destroy
187,ooo bags of chips, worth over $i00,o00.
Id.; see also Richard A. Repp, Comment, Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for Genetically
Modified Crop Production and Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 585, 591-93 (2000) (describing other
incidents of contamination).
io. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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importantly, the non-GMO farmer may find herself unable to sell the
contaminated crop at all. If her plants are now found to contain patented
cell structures claimed by the patentee of the GMO corn, then the farmer
is arguably a patent infringer and selling her crop without the patentee's
permission will be fraught with risk.
The possibility of patent law exacerbating the harm done to the
victim of this type of pollution adds an intriguing twist to the original
problem. Although the fact of contamination through pollen drift is very
real for non-GMO farmers, the danger posed by patent law may seem
far-fetched because, in most areas of the law, passive bystanders" have a
complete defense." Patent law, however, is based on the concept of strict
liability.'3 If a department store sells an infringing product, for example,
the store is liable whether it knew the product was infringing or not.'4 A
scientist working in her lab is guilty of patent infringement even if she
has no idea that the new compound she has just synthesized happens to
fall within the claims of an existing patent.
Monsanto Corporation, the world's leading agricultural biotech
company,'5 has been particularly active in using federal law to police
anyone it finds to be growing its patented plants. 6 For instance, in the
famous Schmeiser litigation, Monsanto, and other commentators, took
the position that a bystanding farmer could be liable for patent
i i. Whenever we use the phrase "bystanding farmer," we refer to a farmer whose fields have
been contaminated by unwanted genetic material against the will of the farmer.
12. See infra notes 287-291 and accompanying text (discussing innocent bystanders in the context
of criminal law).
13. See Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 157o n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Infringement... is a strict
liability offense ... and a court must award damages adequate to compensate for the infringement ...
regardless of the intent, culpability, or motivation of the infringer.").
14. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Seller and User Liability in
Intellectual Property Law, 68 U. GIN. L. REv. 1, 6 (1999) ("Because patent infringement [like copyright
and trademark infringement] is a strict liability tort, the patentee may enjoin the unauthorized
manufacture, use, or sale of the invention, regardless of the infringer's state of mind.").
I5. Monsanto has 85% of its research and development budget, or $430 million annually, invested
in biotechnology. See CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra note 8, at 7. The company "currently holds 647
biotech plant patents, more than any other biotech company." Id. at ii. Monsanto's GMO crops have
been more successful than any other biotech company's, supplying the technology for 9o% of the
world's GMO crops. See MONSANTO CO., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT I (2004).
16. See CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra note 8, at 4; Drew L. Kershen, Of Straying Crops and Patent
Rights, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 575,582-83 (2004).
17. Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 936 (Can.). Although the defendant
canola farmer claimed to be an innocent bystander, the court found that he deliberately planted seeds
that he knew to be infringing. Id. The seeds might have been innocently produced by Schmeiser's
plants due to pollen drift, but the court found it unnecessary to determine how the infringing seeds




infringement stemming from windblown GMO pollen." In fact,
Monsanto's lead in its industry is certainly due in part to its use of
forceful investigations and prosecutions against those it suspects of
patent infringement, regardless of whether such infringers act willfully or
are even aware of their alleged infringement. 9 In short, Monsanto is in
the unique position of being able to take a problem that it created-the
contamination of non-GMO plants by pollen drift from GMO plants-
and use it to its advantage by prosecuting those bystanding farmers
whose crops become contaminated."
Although some articles have discussed the phenomenon of pollen
drift,' none have undertaken any sort of economic analysis or even
accurately analyzed the important patent law issues presented.
Commentators have done a better job canvassing the potential for state
law counterclaims to be made by bystanding victims of pollen drift,22 but
I8. Id.; see also Leora Broydo, The Trouble With Percy, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 13, 2000)
http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2oooi/2/schmeiser.html.
In many ways, the law is on Monsanto's side in this case. Under patent law, it doesn't really
matter whether Schmeiser knew what he was doing or not, he's still an "infringer," says Dan
Burk, a professor at the University of Minnesota Law School who specializes in
biotechnology and intellectual property law.
Id.
19. See CrR. FOR FooD SAFETY, supra note 8, at 4-5.
20. Monsanto devotes seventy-five full-time employees and $1o million per year to prosecutions
and investigations. It is believed that actions and investigations by Monsanto against farmers number
into the thousands, with most settling outside of court in confidential agreements. Id. at 4. Generally,
the company initiates between five hundred and six hundred new investigations each year, many of
which are the result of tips called in to the company's toll-free hotline. Id. at 23-24. Farmers report
that investigators often go onto the lands without permission, sometimes arrive with police escorts, or
sometimes even conduct clandestine surveillance of the farmers' premises. Id. at 24. There have been
approximately ninety actual lawsuits filed by Monsanto against United States farmers, involving 147
farmers and thirty-nine farm companies in twenty-five different states. Id. at 31.
21. See generally A. Bryan Endres, "GMO:" Genetically Modified Organism or Gigantic
Monetary Obligation? The Liability Schemes for GMO Damage in the United States and the European
Union, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 453 (200o); Flood, supra note 7; Grossman, supra note 9;
Kershen, supra note 16; Maria Lee & Robert Burrell, Liability for the Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing
the 'Victim'?, 65 Moo. L. REV. 517 (2002); Thomas P. Redick & Christina G. Bernstein, Nuisance Law
and the Prevention of "Genetic Pollution": Declining a Dinner Date With Damocles, 30 ELR NEws &
ANALYSIS 10328 (2000); Repp, supra note 9; Norman Siebrasse, The Innocent Bystander Problem in the
Patenting of Higher Life Forms, 49 MCGILL L.J. 349 (2004); Marcia E. DeGeer, Comment, Can
Roundup ReadyTM Seeds Ever Be Corralled?: Restraining Genetic Drift Through Criminal Sanctions, 29
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 255 (2003); Hilary Preston, Note, Drift of Patented
Genetically Engineered Crops: Rethinking Liability Theories, 8i TEX. L. REV. 1153 (2003); Scanlon,
supra note 7.
22. See Endres, supra note 28, at 482-93; Flood, supra note 7, at 482-97; Grossman, supra note 9,
at 227-38; Kershen, supra note 16, at 6oo-605; Lee & Burrell, supra note 21, at 529-35; Redick &
Bernstein, supra note 21, at 10339-10342; Repp, supra note 9, at 6oo-20; Scanlon, supra note 7, at 2-
io; Preston, supra note 21, at 1165-1167.
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without reference to the much-needed economic framework provided by
The Problem of Social Cost. In Part I of this Article, we apply the Coase
Theorem and its most useful corollary to the problem of pollen drift. We
conclude that the liability of pollen polluters should be governed by
balancing rules under nuisance law, to be applied on a case-by-case basis,
rather than by a blanket liability or immunity rule. We also conclude that
truly bystanding non-GMO farmers should have a viable defense to
patent infringement because liability would result in the application of a
reverse Pigovian tax that cannot be justified under accepted economic
theory. Only a contextual approach can account for the wide variety of
costs that must be identified before determining whether liability for
genetic pollution is socially desirable.
In the rest of this Article, we demonstrate that existing legal
doctrines support the adoption of the framework we advocate. In order
to do that more effectively, we briefly provide the background science of
genetically modified plants and how their patented characteristics can be
adventitiously transferred, and we also highlight the consequences of
pollen drift by canvassing the multi-billion dollar market for non-GMO
crops. 3 Then, we discuss the common law nuisance and trespass
doctrines that may provide farmers with an affirmative cause of action
when pollen drift causes a reduction in the value of a planted crop.24
Finally, we discuss patent law defenses that may be available to patent
infringement defendants who characterize themselves as victims of
pollen drift (bystanding farmers). 5 We find significant opportunities for
true bystanding farmers to rebut patent infringement claims in the
voluntary act doctrine and in the doctrines of patent misuse, unclean
hands, and volenti non fit injuria. In the spirit of truly descriptive law and
economics analysis, we conclude that applicable common law and
equitable doctrines appear to be efficient.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF NEIGHBORING FARMERS
Coase begins The Problem of Social Cost with a succinct reminder of
his primary concern, "[t]hose actions of business firms which have
harmful effects on others. He then notes the conventional wisdom of
the time, which held that liability (or some sort of tax) should necessarily
be imposed on those who cause damage to their neighbors.27 Through a
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part IV.




series of examples, the most prominent of which involve damage done to
neighboring farmers by wandering cattle and incendiary railroad sparks,"
he shows that in a world without transaction costs the automatic
imposition of liability is socially undesirable (e.g., has negative welfare
effects). If transacting is costless, neighbors will agree to an arrangement
that maximizes social welfare, regardless of whether one neighbor has
the legal right to harm or the other has the legal right to be free from
harm. This is the primary thrust of the Coase Theorem, although it is not
labeled as such in his original paper. 9 Since it is hardly intuitive, we apply
Coase's insight about a world without transaction costs to several
scenarios involving pollen drift. Then we move on to the real world, a
world of costly transactions, which Coase also discusses at length in his
seminal paper. In that world, the initial assignment of rights and
therefore the liability rule chosen, matter significantly.
A. POLLEN DRIFT IN A WORLD WITH No TRANSACTION COSTS
Let us imagine an organic farmer, first farming alone, then
confronted with a neighbor who plants GMO corn. We illustrate that
assuming zero transaction costs, the net social benefit3" from their
farming operations are the same regardless of the liability rule chosen.
i. Solo Farmer
The first player is an organic farming operation that plants non-
GMO corn on ten acres of land. Without interference, the organic
farming firm expends $20 producing thirty bushels of corn that will sell
for $4 per bushel. In order to get the $4 per bushel price, the farmer must
not only plant non-GMO seed, but must also forego the use of pesticides,
herbicides, and non-organic fertilizer. The net value of the corn produced
is $I00.
28. Id. at 97-104 (discussing cattle straying onto farmer's land and destroying crops); id. at 137-43
(discussing sparks from railway that destroy farmer's crop).
29. In a subsequent essay, Coase ascribes the naming of his theorem to George Stigler. See R.H.
COASE, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 157, 157 (1988).
He summarizes "the essence of the Coase Theorem" as "the delimitation of-rights is an essential
prelude to market transactions ... the ultimate result (which maximizes the value of production) is
independent of the legal decision." Id. at 158. Stigler's formulation, acceptable to Coase, is somewhat
different: "[U]nder perfect competition private and social costs will be equal." Id.
30. In this Part we will generally ignore third-party wealth effects, such as the effect of legal rules
governing pollen drift on global plant diversity or on the income of patentees. Those issues are
addressed at the end of this Part.
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Scenario i.o: SOLO FARMER
ORGANIC FARMER
I0 Acres/3o Bushels
($4/bushel x 30) - $20 Cost of Production [C.O.P.] = $ioo
2. Two Farmers/No Liability
When a GMO farming firm moves next to the organic firm, the
scenario changes. The GMO firm also plants ten acres of corn, but its
corn is genetically modified to be highly productive if expensive
herbicides, pesticides, and chemical fertilizers are used properly. The
GMO firm will harvest one hundred bushels, but its costs of production
are high ($ioo) and it can only sell its corn for $2 per bushel.3 The net
value of the corn it produces is therefore $100.32 Unfortunately for the
neighboring organic firm, GMO pollen blown from the new farm
contaminates its crop. This means that the organic farm will now only be
able to collect the $2 per bushel price for GMO corn when it delivers its
30 bushel harvest to market. Its profit will only be $40 ($60 - $20 C.O.P.),
unless the law provides it some sort of remedy. Under a regime which
imposes no liability on the GMO farmer, the net value of corn produced
by the two firms is $140, as illustrated below:
Scenario 2.o: No LIABILITY
GMO FARMER ORGANIC FARMER
io Acres/ioo Bushels io Acres/3o Bushels
($2/bushel x Ioo) - $ioo C.O.P. = $ioo ($2/bushel x 30) - $20 C.O.P. = $40
JOINT PRODUCTION = $140
Note that the organic farming firm should be willing to pay up to $60
to the GMO farmer not to plant GMO seed that will contaminate its
fields and drive down the value of its corn. For example, assume that the
GMO firm could switch to a non-GMO seed that would reduce its
production from one hundred to eighty bushels (and lower its costs of
production to $90 because the seed is cheaper). If transactions between
the farmers are costless, then we might see the organic farmer paying, for
example, $30 to the GMO farmer to plant the alternative non-GMO
31. See Flood, supra note 7, at 474 (discussing the lower price received by sellers of GMO corn).
32. Although it is not necessary to assume that both organic and non-organic farmers acting alone
will earn the same, setting the values equal allows us to disregard altruistic reasons why a farmer might
chose one form of farming over the other.
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seed. In that case, the GMO farmer would still make $ioo, while the
organic farmer would make $70. We assume that the GMO farmer who
switches to a non-GMO seed does not also become an organic farmer,
which would require him to forego the use of pesticides, herbicides, and
artificial fertilizers-a much more costly transformation.33 Notice that
under these assumptions, the net value of production in this case rises to
$170, as illustrated below:
Scenario 2.1: No LIABILITY + Low SWITCHING COSTS
GMO FARMER ORGANIC FARMER
io Acres/8o Bushels io Acres/3o Bushels
($2/bushel x 8o) - $90 C.O.P. + $30 = $ioo ($4/bushel x 30) - $20 C.O.P. - $30 = $70
JOINT PRODUCTION = $170
In order to understand the importance of our present assumption of
zero transaction costs, we note that the value of joint production would
fall back to $140 if the cost of negotiating a deal between the GMO and
the organic farmer were more than $30. 31 If the cost were greater than
$30, a deal could not be made that would benefit both parties; therefore,
there would be no agreement and the resulting joint production would be
the same as Scenario 2.0.
Consider one final permutation of the no-liability scenario. In
Scenario 2.1 above, the GMO farmer's cost of switching to a different
activity (planting an alternative seed) was $30. If switching costs are
sufficiently low for the organic farming firm, it might be induced-
without having to transact with its neighbor-to plant GMO seeds.
Under a zero switching costs scenario, the joint value of the corn
produced will be $200, as illustrated below:
Scenario 2.2: No LIABILITY + ZERO SWITCHING COSTS
GMO FARMER ORGANIC FARMER
io Acres/ioo Bushels io Acres/ioo Bushels
($2/bushel x ioo) - $ioo C.O.P. = $Ioo ($2/bushel x ioo) - $ioo C.O.P. = $ioo
JOINT PRODUCTION = $170
33. However, if he could switch all the way to organic farming, as in Scenario 3.2 infra, he would
receive $4 per bushel instead of $2.
34. This is because the organic farmer will spend no more than $60 to prevent $6o worth of
damage, and the GMO farmer must be paid at least $30 in order to change. Therefore, any negotiation
that costs more than $30 will not be undertaken by the organic farmer.
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To summarize, under a regime of no liability for pollen
contamination, the joint value of corn produced will be $140, $170, or
$200, depending on the relative switching costs assumed in the above
hypotheticals.
3. Two Farmers/Liability
Under an alternative legal regime of liability for pollen
contamination, the joint values of the corn produced will be exactly the
same under the same set of assumptions. Consider first how liability
would change the outcome for the GMO farming firm. It would still
produce ioo bushels of corn that it could sell for $2 per bushel, but it
would have to pay $6o in damages to the organic farmer who was forced
to sell his thirty bushels for the $2 per bushel GMO price, as opposed to
the $4 per bushel organic price. The damages paid to the organic farmer
will allow him to receive the net $ioo profit he was making before his
neighbor arrived. The value of their joint production is $140, as
illustrated below:
Scenario 3.0: LIABILITY
GMO FARMER ORGANIC FARMER
1o Acres/ioo Bushels io Acres/3o Bushels
($2/bushel x ioo) - $Ioo C.O.P. - $6o = $40 ($2/bushel x 30) - $20 C.O.P. + $60 = $ioo
JOINT PRODUCTION = $140
Given the above scenario, the GMO farming firm is likely to
consider alternatives to planting GMO corn seeds in order to avoid
paying the $6o in damages to the organic farmer. If, as assumed in
Scenario 2.1, it can switch to a non-GMO seed and produce eighty
bushels of corn instead of one hundred, it will have an incentive to do so.
Note that the joint value of production would rise to $170, as illustrated
below:
Scenario 3.1: LIABILITY + Low SWITCHING COSTS
GMO FARMER ORGANIC FARMER
io Acres/8o Bushels io Acres/3o Bushels
($2/bushel x 8o) - $90 C.O.P. = $70 ($4/bushel x 30) - $20 C.O.P. = $ioo
JOINT PRODUCTION = $170
Note here that the GMO farmer was induced by the liability rule to
change its behavior without having to transact with the organic farmer.
In other words, the efficient joint production of $170 was obtained
November 2006]
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without a transaction at all. This was not true on the parallel facts of
Scenario 2.1, where the organic farmer had to negotiate with the GMO
farmer to switch to a non-GMO seed. In other words, in a world with
sufficiently high transaction costs, the value of joint production may be
different in Scenario 2.1 ($170 with no transaction costs but $140 with
significant transaction costs) and Scenario 3.1 ($17o regardless of
transaction costs). Clearly, the assumption of zero transaction costs is
essential to the proposition that the choice of liability or no liability is
irrelevant to net social welfare. When transaction costs are accounted
for, the choice of a rule of liability or no liability may well affect social
welfare.35
Finally, it is worth considering one more permutation within the
liability scenario. If switching costs were sufficiently low, the GMO
farming firm might be induced to change its practices entirely and
become an organic farmer, which would mean not only foregoing GMO
seeds, but also not using chemical herbicides, pesticides, and fertilizers.
In the unlikely case where switching costs are zero for the GMO firm, the
joint production in subsequent years might rise to $200, as illustrated
below:
Scenario 3.2: LIABILITY + ZERO SWITCHING COSTS
Ex-GMO FARMER ORGANIC FARMER
io Acres/3o Bushels io Acres/3o Bushels
($4/bushel x 30) - $20 C.O.P. = $ioo ($4/bushel x 30) - $20 C.O.P. = $100
JOINT PRODUCTION = $200
To summarize, under a regime of liability for pollen contamination,
the joint value of corn produced will be $140, $170, or $200, depending
on how costly it is for the GMO farmer to switch from GMO farming to
alternative farming techniques.
4. Conclusions
First, the magnitude of switching costs will affect the value of joint
corn production between the neighbors, but the choice of liability or no
liability has no effect on net corn production, which will always be $140,
$170, or $200 given the assumed level of switching costs. In other words,
although each farmer may care deeply about which rule is adopted, the
35. Coase emphasizes this point. See COASE, supra note 2, at 115 (noting that when transaction
costs are taken into account, "the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the
efficiency with which the economic system operates").
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legal system arguably should not because the net corn production under
either legal regime is the same. Second, as seen in the comparison of
Scenarios 2.J and 3.1, the assumption of zero transaction costs is critical
to the validity of the first conclusion. Both of those scenarios were based
on identical factual assumptions, but in a world of high transaction costs,
we saw a $30 difference in net social welfare ($17o as compared to $140)
depending on the liability rule adopted. We shall explore the world of
transaction costs in more detail below. This is how the Coase Theorem
works in a nutshell: in a world with no transaction costs, there seems to
be no economic reason to impose liability on the pollen polluter. The tax
on harm caused by neighbors suggested by Pigou is not justified. 6
We must note that we have not only ignored transaction costs, but
also third party wealth effects. The choice of liability rules may affect
parties outside the two-player paradigm employed above. A rule of no
liability, for example, might force most organic farmers to switch to
GMO farming, resulting in crop monocultures that are vulnerable to
catastrophic failure or that threaten genetic or ecological diversity. A
rule of liability for pollen drift, on the other hand, might affect the net
income of firms that sell patented GMO seeds. We consider these sorts
of externalities in Part I.D below.
B. POLLEN DRIFr IN A WORLD WITH HIGH TRANSACTION COSTS
To quote Professor Coase, a world without transaction costs "is, of
course, a very unrealistic assumption."37 It is often very costly for parties
to come to an agreement, and in the case of pollen drift, it may be very
difficult for the victim of airborne contamination to even identify the
proper part(ies) with whom to negotiate. In the case of a crop like corn,
which casts its pollen for miles,3 it may be impossible for an organic
farmer to identify and bring to the table all the possible GMO farming
firms that might be the cause of contamination. It is no surprise that
Coase himself uses airborne pollution as an example of a nuisance which
raises the specter of prohibitively high transaction costs. He describes the
number of the parties potentially affected by a belching smokestack and
notes that the airborne pollutants would "affect a vast number of people
engaged in a wide variety of activities."39 In general, he concludes that
transacting is "often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to
prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which
36. See PIGOU, supra note 4.
37. COASE, supra note 2, at I14.
38. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
39. COASE, supra note 2, at 117.
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the pricing system worked without cost."'4
As we explain in the previous Part, when transacting is costly, as it is
very likely to be in the pollen drift context, the choice of liability rules
may affect social welfare. For this reason Coase argues that "[o]nce the
costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account ... the
initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency
with which the economic system operates."'" When transactions are
costless, neighbors can negotiate around whatever liability rule is
imposed on them. The rule will affect the distribution of wealth between
the parties, but net social welfare will remain the same. When transacting
is costly, we must be careful in advocating one rule over another, because
the parties may not be able to adjust to maximize their joint production.
This is the primary corollary of the Coase Theorem. As Coase warns,
unless the efficient arrangement of rights is that "established by the legal
system, the costs of reaching the same [efficient] result by altering and
combining rights through the market may be so great that this optimal
arrangement of rights, and the greater value of production which it
would bring, may never be achieved."42 We see how this corollary plays
out in the illustrations below and then apply the framework to the
specific question of what legal rules should govern the problem of pollen
drift.
i. Assigning Rights in Context
Depending on the individual facts of a particular pollen drift case,
society should sometimes prefer a rule of liability for contamination and
other times prefer a rule of no liability. Take, for example, the fact
situation discussed above in Scenarios 2.J and 3.1. In both those
hypotheticals, the organic farming firm would suffer a $60 loss if its crop
were contaminated by a neighbor's GMO pollen. We assume now that
the cost of negotiating an agreement for the organic farmer to pay the
polluter $30 to switch to an alternative non-GMO seed would be too
high, given the practicalities of meeting, negotiating, drafting, inspecting,
and monitoring the agreement. In addition, the distance that corn pollen
travels will make it very difficult for the organic farmer to discover
40. Id. at 114.
In order to carry out a market transaction, it is necessary to discover who it is that one
wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection
needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.
Id.
41. Id. at 115.
42. Id.
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beforehand whose pollen will cause the contamination. Or, more than
one GMO farmer may be nearby, which complicates negotiations. If
transaction costs are sufficiently high and there is no liability for the
contamination, then the value of the joint corn production would be
$140, as illustrated below:
Scenario 4.o: No LIABILITY
GMO FARMER ORGANIC FARMER
io Acres/Ioo Bushels io Acres/3o Bushels
($2/bushel x ioo) - $Ioo G.O.P. = $IOO ($2/bushel x 30) - $20 C.O.P. = $40
JOINT PRODUCTION = $140
If, however, we impose liability on the GMO farmer for damage
done to the organic farmer, then the GMO farming firm will have a
monetary incentive to switch to the alternative non-GMO seed. If it does,
then the value of joint production rises to $170, as illustrated below:
Scenario 4.1: LIABILITY
GMO FARMER ORGANIC FARMER
IO Acres/8o Bushels io Acres/3o Bushels
($2/bushel x 80) - $90 C.O.P. = $70 ($2/bushel x 30) - $20 C.O.P. + $6o = $ioo
JOINT PRODUCTION - $170
On these facts, it is clear that society should prefer a rule of liability
for the contamination because net welfare will be higher. As we see
below, however, it would be improper to generalize from this result. As
Coase suggests, a different context may require a different assignment of
rights.
For example, consider the following example that accounts for the
fact that soybean pollen does not travel nearly as far as corn pollen.43 We
offer the case of an organic soybean farming firm that produces thirty
bushels of beans on ten acres after expending $20 in production costs and
receives $4 per bushel for its crop before a GMO soybean enterprise
begins farming on a neighboring field. The GMO farming firm also
plants ten acres. It produces one hundred bushels after expending $ioo in
production costs, for which it receives $2 per bushel. If GMO pollen
contaminates the organic farming firm, it will lose $6o in profits. The
contamination could be averted if the GMO farmer switches to an
43. See infra notes 83-9o and accompanying text.
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alternative seed. If the GMO firm switches, it will produce twenty fewer
bushels, save $io in its cost of production, and receive $30 less in income.
Because soybean pollen does not travel nearly as far as corn pollen, the
contamination could be averted if the organic farmer leaves fallow a ten-
foot strip of land adjoining the GMO farmer's property. The cost to the
organic farmer of leaving the strip of land fallow is $20. If the GMO
farmer is liable for the contamination, it will switch to the non-GMO
corn and the value of the joint corn production will be $170, as illustrated
below:
Scenario 5.o: LIABILITY
GMO FARMER ORGANIC FARMER
io Acres/8o Bushels io Acres/3o Bushels
($2/bushel x 80) - $90 C.O.P. = $70 ($4/bushel x 30) - $20 C.O.P. = $IOO
JOINT PRODUCTION = $170
If the GMO farming firm is not liable, then it has no incentive to
switch to non-GMO seeds and it will produce a crop worth $ioo. The
organic farmer, worried about damage caused by contamination, will
leave fallow a ten-foot strip of land at a cost of $20, dropping the value of
its production to $8o. Note that joint production in this case rises to $I8o,
as illustrated below:
Scenario 5.r: No LIABILITY
GMO FARMER ORGANIC FARMER
io Acres/8o Bushels IO Acres/3o Bushels
($2/bushel x ioo) - $ioo C.O.P. = $1oo ($4/bushel x 30) - $20 C.O.P. - $20 = $80
JOINT PRODUCTION = $i8o
Under the facts of our soybean hypothetical, joint production is
maximized by the adoption of a rule of non-liability. Unlike in our corn
example, net social welfare is maximized if the GMO farmer is not held
liable for pollen drift contamination.
In a world without transaction costs, the choice of rules would not
matter. In Scenario 4.0 (no liability), the organic farmer would pay the
GMO farmer to switch to a non-GMO seed and then joint production
would be the same as in Scenario 4.1 (liability). In Scenario 5.0 (liability),
the GMO farmer would pay the organic farmer to leave a strip of land
fallow and joint production would be the same as in Scenario 5.1 (no
liability). In the real world of high transaction costs, however, the choice
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of rules will have a significant effect on net social welfare. Sometimes it
makes economic sense to hold neighbors liable for contamination caused
by drifting pollen; sometimes it does not. As Coase explains, "[w]hether
[a liability rule] is desirable or not depends on the particular
circumstances."44
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMON LAW ADJUDICATION
Coase discusses at length many common law cases involving
neighbors who do harm to each other.45 Consistent with his theoretical
analysis, when transaction costs must be accounted for, the criterion of
efficiency justifies liability in some cases but not in others.46 Indeed, a
case-by-case analysis of problems involving neighbors seems to be the
only feasible approach, considering the numerous facts necessary to
making the proper decisions. In the scenarios set forth above we had to
examine farming methods, typical crop yields, costs of production,
market values, the availability of alternative seeds and protective
measures, and the magnitude of each farmer's switching costs. The
change in a single factor, for example from corn to soybeans, can
generate a different optimal arrangement of rights between the two
parties.
We suggest, therefore, that any common law method of adjudication
that is sensitive to the relevant factors identified above has the potential
to establish efficient rules for liability or non-liability. We will discuss in
Part III below whether the nuisance, trespass, and strict liability
doctrines employed by the American law of neighbors are up to the task,
but first we must apply the Coasean framework to the complex questions
raised when the patentee of the GMO product claims to have suffered
harm that deserves recompense. Discussing patent law is important,
because if patent law imposes liability on bystanding farmers, then their
costs of production will rise and the equilibria described above will be
upset. If those equilibria represent efficient results, then measuring the
intrusion of patent law into the game becomes critically important.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENT LAW
Many GMO seeds and the pollen that GMO plants produce are
patented.47 So far, we have ignored the interests of patentees claiming a
44. COASE, supra note 2, at 141.
45. Id. at 105-14, 121-31.
46. See id. at 131 ("It is all a question of weighing up the gains that would accrue from eliminating
these harmful effects against the gains that accrue from allowing them to continue.").
47. See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer High-Bred Int'l Inc., 534 U.S. 125, 141 (20O); see, e.g.,
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property right in genetic material cast to the wind. 8 Unless the GMO
farm is owned by a biotech research firm like Monsanto, it is unlikely
that the GMO farmer will also be the owner of the patent on the GMO
seed, plant, and pollen. Therefore, the possible claims of a third party,
the patentee, must be considered.
Patent law gives the patent owner the exclusive right to use, make,
sell, offer to sell, and import the invention subject to the patent.49 Patent
law is based on notions of strict liability; neither the infringer's
knowledge, nor her intent, is relevant." Patent law does not excuse
unwitting or inadvertent infringement. A brief look at U.S. Patent No.
6,ii4,610, owned by Monsanto Corporation, demonstrates the
plausibility of the claim that even a bystanding farmer should be liable:
[The patent] relates to the seeds of inbred corn line ASG27 , to the
plants of inbred corn line ASG27 and to methods for producing a corn
plant produced by crossing the inbred line ASG27 with itself or
another corn line [and] to hybrid corn seeds and plants produced by
crossing the inbred line ASG27 with another corn line.'
In addition to claiming the plant,52 its seeds,53 hybrid plants, 4 and hybrid
seeds,55 the patent covers the pollen of the plant,56 the method for cross-
breeding a hybrid, 7 and various gene conversions" of the patented plant.
Given the broad scope of Monsanto's claims, it is relatively easy to
see how a bystanding farmer could unwittingly violate the patentee's
statutory rights. If the wind blows the patented pollen onto a bystanding
farmer's corn plants and those plants are pollinated, then the farmer has
arguably used the pollen in violation of the Monsanto patent. The
the seed corn patent described infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
48. As long as the bystander affected by pollen drift views the genetically modified organism as
harmful contamination, this seems appropriate. In the case of an organic farmer who does not want
the genetic material, then the patent owner has not been damaged by losing a potential sale. A
recipient of pollen drift might be a beneficiary, however, if it welcomed the new genetic material. This
was allegedly the case in Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.), where
Monsanto claimed the farmer took deliberate advantage of Round-Up Ready plants that were
pesticide resistant. Id. at 936.
49. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003).
50. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3 d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. I995)
("Infringement is... a strict liability offense."), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 0997).
51. U.S. Patent No. 6,iI4,6io (filed Dec. 8, 1998).
52. Id. atcol. i 1.55.
53. Id. atcol. i 11.52-54.
54. Id. at col.12 11.23-24.
55. Id. at col.12 1.22.
56. Id. at col.i1 1.57.
57. Id. at col.i2 11.i6-21.
58. Id. at col.12 11.34-6o.
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pollinated plants would then produce hybrid seeds in potential violation
of Monsanto's method patent for hybridization and its product patent for
hybrid seeds. If the plants are harvested and the hybrid seed sold, a
further violation of Monsanto's right to sell the patented seeds may
occur. Any infringement of the patent gives its owner the right to
injunctive relief, which most importantly includes enjoining the sale of
the harvested crops.59 Patent owners may also recover damages or a
reasonable royalty for the infringement. 6°
Although the legal argument for infringement liability is plausible,
the Coasean analysis conducted above suggests that a liability rule of
uniform applicability is not justified economically. Remember that the
primary argument in The Problem of Social Cost is against the automatic
levying of a Pigovian tax (a real tax or the imposition of legal liability) on
a firm that causes harm to another." As we have seen, it often makes
economic sense to allow one firm to engage in an activity that harms
another without forcing that firm to internalize its costs. For example, in
Scenario 5.1, net social welfare was maximized by a rule of no liability for
a GMO soybean farmer. Once we account for transaction costs,
optimizing social welfare will sometimes demand a liability rule and
sometimes not. It follows that the automatic levying of a Pigovian tax on
the passive recipient of pollen drift cannot be justified, and therefore,
liability for bystanding farmers in all cases cannot be justified.
i. Farmers Benefiting from Pollen Drift
According to Coase, if transaction costs are high, then different
contexts should demand differing liability approaches.62 Consider
Farmer A who plants ten acres with herbicide-resistant GMO canola
seed. After expending $ioo on operating costs (seed, pesticides, and
herbicides) he will harvest one hundred bushels which he can sell for $2
per bushel. His $ioo in operating costs includes a royalty payment to
Patentee, who invented the herbicide-resistant seed. A neighbor, Farmer
B, plants ten acres with cheaper non-GMO seed. In year one, after
expending $9o for seed, pesticides, and herbicides, he will harvest eighty-
five bushels of corn which he can sell for $2 per bushel. During the
growing season, pollen from Farmer A's GMO canola fertilizes Farmer
B's canola. After the harvest, Farmer B saves enough hybrid seed to
plant the following year. In year two, after expending only $8o for
59. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B) (2003).
6o. Id. § 271(e)(4)(C).
6I. COASE, supra note 2, at 180-84.
62. Id. at 178.
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pesticide and herbicides, Farmer B harvests one hundred bushels that he
can sell for $2 per bushel. In year two, Farmer A makes the same $ioo
profit that he made in year one, while Farmer B makes $120. Farmer A's
$ioo operating costs include a $20 royalty payment to Patentee. In
developing the seed, Patentee's research and development costs allocable
to year two were $35. If Farmer B is not liable for patent infringement to
Patentee, then the value of joint production of Farmer A, Farmer B, and
Patentee is $205, as illustrated below:
Scenario 6.o: No LIABILITY
FARMER A FARMER B
io Acres/ioo Bushels io Acres/ioo Bushels
($2/bushel x ioo) - $ioo C.O.P. = $ioo ($2/bushel x ioo) - $8o C.O.P. = $120
PATENTEE
$20 Royalty Payment - $35 Research and Development Costs = (-$15)
JOINT PRODUCTION = $205
Note that imposing liability for patent infringement will not change
the value of the joint production of the three parties.
Scenario 6.i: LIABILITY
FARMER A FARMER B
io Acres/ioo Bushels io Acres/ioo Bushels
($2/bushel x ioo) - $ioo C.O.P. = $ioo ($2/bushel x ioo) - $80 C.O.P. - $20
damages = $ I oo
PATENTEE
$20 Royalty Payment + $2o Damage Award
$40 - $35 Research and Development Costs = $5
JOINT PRODUCTION = $205
At first glance, there seems little reason to require a transfer
payment from Farmer B to Patentee. If joint production is not increased,
a deadweight loss is created by requiring a sterile transfer. Nonetheless,
even though the imposition of liability for infringement does not increase
the net value of the joint production, a plausible economic argument can
be made that unless Patentee can recover its research and development
costs by collecting royalties for the use of its invention, it will have
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inadequate incentives to invent the herbicide-resistant seed. This sort of
negative externality is relevant to Coasean analysis, and the hypothetical
is designed to accentuate this point. If the seed company knows that it
cannot collect a second royalty, its research and development costs ($35)
will exceed its expected return ($20 from Farmer A), and it may not
invent the seed. This externality is "harm" in the sense Coase uses the
term.6 3 Without the herbicide-resistant seed, both farmers will be forced
to use the non-GMO seed planted by Farmer B initially, and Patentee
will save the $35 expended on research and development. The value of
joint production will fall to $I95 without the availability of the GMO
seed, as illustrated below:
Scenario 6.2: GMO SEED NEVER INVENTED
FARMER A FARMER B
io Acres/85 Bushels io Acres/85 Bushels
($2/bushel x 85) - $90 C.O.P. = $8o ($2/bushel x 85) - $90 C.O.P. = $8o
PATENTEE
No Royalty Payments
Research and Development Costs Saved = $35
JOINT PRODUCTION = $195
A comparison of Scenarios 6.I and 6.2 seems to make a strong case
for liability. Forcing the transfer payment will stimulate production of the
herbicide-resistant seed, which will in turn increase the net value of corn
production by $io, to $205. It appears that net social welfare is increased.
Scenario 6.2 assumes, however, that Patentee will not do anything
socially useful with the $35 research and development expenditure that it
has saved. This is a highly unrealistic assumption. If those savings can be
invested to produce value that exceeds the $20 corn production gain,
then society should prefer that the herbicide-resistant seed not be
invented. This question of marginal utility pinpoints one reason why
economists are so hesitant to argue that patent law is efficient; it is
extremely difficult to account for the alternative uses to which inventive
resources might be put.
64
63. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
64- See also Paul J. Heald, The Vices of Originality, I99I Sup. CT. REV. 143, 157 n.69 (i99i) ("In
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The argument in favor of liability, therefore, is linked to the
assertion that patent law provides efficient incentives to invent. It
certainly does in our hypothetical, but the matter is far from• 6,
undisputed. We could easily change the facts so that the incentive effect
is missing.66 Nonetheless, at least in some cases, one can argue that the
negative externality caused by the bystanding farmer's use without
compensation should be internalized in the form of a rule requiring a
transfer payment to the patentee.
By re-characterizing the fact situation as presenting a positive
externality (higher corn production for Farmer B) generated by the
inventive effort of the Patentee, a similar argument can be offered why
Farmer B should be liable. Demsetz has argued that systems of private
property are more efficient than systems of common property.6 7 If we let
Farmer B benefit from Patentee's inventive efforts without paying, then
we are treating the herbicide-resistant genetic material as common
property. Liability would privatize the genetic material and allow the
inventor of the herbicide-resistant seed to recover the benefit conferred
on Farmer B. According to Demsetzian analysis, forcing a transfer
payment from Farmer B in the amount of the benefit will arguably
other words, a work should be [patentable] only if necessary to encourage the work and the work is
more socially useful than whatever else the [inventor] would choose to do, for example, child rearing
or brickmasonry."); cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 37 (3d ed. 1986) ("The
costs of the patent system include ... inducing potentially excessive investment in inventing."); Janusz
A. Ordover, Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting Industrial and Intellectual
Property, 53 ANTrITUST L.J. 503, 507 (1985) ("[Patent law] may lead to excessive investment in the
creation of intellectual and industrial property.").
65. See Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 499 (2005)
(discussing "empirical studies demonstrating... the poor correlation between R&D and patenting
shown in recent studies on the impact of the Federal Circuit on the behavior of inventive firms... and
... the prevalence of patenting despite low levels of licensing, use, and highly uncertain prospects for
super-competitive profits ...."); see also id. at 499-506 (collecting studies critical of incentive theory of
patent law). For the most famous statement of skepticism, see S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG.,
AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: STUDY No. 15 OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (reporting Fritz Machlup's study):
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have
had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.
66. For example, if the inventor's research and development costs are $50, and the two farmers
constituting the entire potential market for the seed would not be willing to pay more than a $20
royalty each, a liability rule will not stimulate the invention of the new seed. Or, if the inventor is
himself a farmer who can make a substantial profit over his R&D costs by inventing the new seed,
then making other farmers liable provides no added incentive. The seed would be invented even in the
absence of liability.
67. See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
PAPERS & PROC. 347 (1967).
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optimize social welfare.68 In Demsetz's view, the value of the additional
corn that Farmer B harvests in year two is a positive externality created
by Patentee's inventive efforts that should be captured by Patentee.
Professor Frischman describes Demsetz's normative thesis as arguing
that "the emergence of private property rights to enable the
internalization of externalities is desirable (in an economic framework,
social welfare maximizing)." ' It is hotly disputed whether Demsetz's
theory of property should be extended to spillovers created by intangible
public goods like inventions,70 but his approach does provide another
argument in favor of liability.
Coase and Demsetz really present two sides of the same coin.
Externalities, whether described as positive or negative, get treated the
same way by economists. One can argue that the infringing farmer
should internalize the negative effect its behavior has on research and
development incentives, or one can argue that the patentee should
internalize the positive effect its inventiveness has on the infringing
farmer. In either case, liability is premised on the notion that the
patentee will make a sub-optimal investment in research and
development expenditures. If patent law has a significant incentive effect
on research and development expenditures and those expenditures are
not wasted, then a plausible argument can be made that a benefiting
bystanding farmer should have to make a transfer payment to the
patentee.
2. Farmers Harmed by Pollen Drift
Although forcing the transfer payment of $20 from Farmer B to
Patentee in the above scenario may be justified as the recovery of a
benefit conferred on Farmer B by the inventive efforts of Patentee, the
same cannot be said in the case of the organic farmer who is harmed by
pollen drift. In such a case, there is no benefit conferred and the
economic justification for the transfer payment is missing. A transfer
68. Id.
69. Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 2 REV. L. & ECON.
(forthcoming 2oo6) (manuscript at 2, on file with author); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation
of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 515, 515-16 (2002) ("Demsetz argued
that.., systems of private property generally outperform systems of common property, because when
individuals internalize both the costs and benefits of their decisions they are more likely to advance
the social interest ....").
70. See Frischmann, supra note 69, at 3-5; see also Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of
Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 997-98 (2005); Mark A. Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1072 (2005); Brett M.
Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers I (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law and
Econ., Working Paper No. 321, 2oo6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=898881.
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payment would be sterile, imposing a deadweight loss on society.
Imposing liability on opportunistic farmers who benefit from pollen
drift is based on contested assumptions about the incentive effects of
patent law and the desirability of internalizing the positive wealth effects
of production. Both of these theories are premised on the notion that a
patentee should be able to capture the benefits generated by the
invention. In the case of the organic farmer, the invention confers no
benefit; in fact, it imposes a cost. Imposing liability in the case of a
bystanding non-GMO farmer would constitute a reverse Pigovian tax,
forcing someone who has suffered a harm to make a transfer payment to
the party who caused the injury. There is no positive externality to be
internalized. Both theories also presume that liability takes the place of
voluntary transactions that would have been entered into in the market.
For example, given his expected benefit, Farmer B should have been
willing to pay up to $20 for the use of the herbicide-resistant seed in our
prior scenario. The farmer behaved opportunistically and avoided the
payment, but imposing liability would mimic the sort of transaction that
normally occurs on the market-just look at how Farmer A behaved. In
the case of the organic farmer, however, imposing liability would not
mimic a transaction that would otherwise be entered into. The farmer
does not want to use the invention. In fact, the organic farmer is willing
in Scenario 2.1 to pay to avoid having to use the GMO product.
We conclude, therefore, that there is no economic justification for
imposing liability on a bystanding farmer who is harmed by pollen drift,
while we concluded earlier that an opportunistic farmer who takes
advantage of wind-blown genetic material should be liable. This is
consistent with Coasean analysis which suggests that "[w]hether [a
liability rule] is desirable or not depends on the particular
circumstances."7' In addition, we note that the equilibria between the
neighboring farmers described above remains constant. Where the
bystanding farmer is harmed, patent law plays no role. From the
standpoint of the opportunistic beneficiary, there is no harm between the
neighbors to complain of, and the scenario falls outside the two-neighbor
nuisance model that we describe.
II. GMO CROP PATENTS AND NoN-GMO MARKETS
In Parts III and IV we examine the common law and statutory rules
that govern the problem of pollen drift. In order to understand the
importance of getting both the economics and the law correct, we will
71. COASE, supra note 2, at 141.
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briefly examine the technology relevant to the problem and take a
snapshot of the potentially affected markets.
A. GMO CROPS
The technology that produces GMO crops works to alter certain
traits of the plant, such as size, color, lifespan, and resistance to certain
pests or chemicals. Scientists begin by isolating the gene that produces
the particular trait. Then, the isolated gene is integrated in the new plant,
and the plant begins producing proteins that control the desired trait.
Thus, if a plant has been genetically modified, successive generations will
begin to exhibit the trait that the scientists desired it to have. 2 As
scientists have developed GMO crops in recent years, and those same
crops have begun to find their way to the world market for food, the
issues surrounding GMO crops have heated up. On one side are biotech
companies and other advocates of GMO crop technology, who tout the
benefits of increased yields and convenience. For example, because
herbicides do not discriminate-that is, they will kill weeds and
surrounding crops-spraying Roundup or other herbicides is a delicate
and time-consuming practice. 3  Herbicide-resistant crops, like
Monsanto's Roundup Ready series, can save farmers time and money
because the farmer does not have to spray carefully around his crops.74 In
addition, plants that are genetically modified to repel insects save
farmers from having to spray crops with expensive insecticides.75
Beyond the basic convenience of GMO crops, advocates boast that
GMO crops have the potential to be a major factor in alleviating some of
the world's hunger. GMO crops might be created to grow larger and
faster and have more vitamins and minerals. 6 In developing countries
with severe food shortages and populations suffering from malnutrition,
these characteristics of GMO crops could arguably effect beneficial
change.77
GMO crops, despite their claimed advantages, do have significant
opposition. Critics cite the many risks of GMO crops: human allergies,
plant resistance to pesticides and antibiotics, and the general loss of
72. For a brief summary of the science behind GMO crops, see Gabrielle J. Persley & James N.
Siedow, Applications of Biotechnology to Crops: Benefits and Risks, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS
222-25 (Michael Ruse & David Castle eds., 2002).
73. Flood, supra note 7, at 477-78.
74- Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 478-79.
77. Id. at 479.
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biodiversity. 75 There are also environmental risks to consider. Some warn
that the insecticide-ready GMO crops could actually increase the
population of harmful insects and could create "superbugs. ' ' 79 Likewise,
some scientists worry that herbicide-ready GMO crops could
contaminate the surrounding weeds, creating "uncontrollable
'superweeds."'80
The potential human health risks of GMOs have also been debated.
One possibility is that people may develop allergic reactions to certain
GMO food products that contain foreign materials, for example, from
products like corn or beans that have been modified with peanuts or
Brazil nuts.8' Critics' concerns are magnified by the fact that GMO foods
do not currently have to be labeled in this country; thus, American
consumers are often not warned that they are ingesting a product that
may produce a harmful allergic reaction."82 Beyond these immediate
concerns lies what is perhaps the most controversial aspect of GMO
crops-the unknown. The technology employed to produce GMOs may
be too new to provide reliable information about the long-term effects of
crop usage.83 Although regulators have deemed biotech crops safe for the
time being, opponents are concerned that there simply is not enough
information to back that conclusion.
Despite strong opposition, biotech crops have managed to secure a
large part of the domestic market for crops and crop commodities. There
are currently four main GMO crops utilized in the United States: soy,
cotton, corn, and canola. 8' In 2004, GMO crops made up 85% of the
United States soy acreage, 45% of the corn acreage, 76% of the cotton
acreage, and 84% of the canola acreage.5
Interestingly, corn pollen poses special problems because it is
especially susceptible to pollen drift. Spherical corn pollen particles are
much larger than pollen produced by other plants, allowing them to
86travel farther on the breeze. Pollen from corn also finds its way to the
78. See Preston, supra note 21, at 1153-54 (describing opposition to GMO crops).
79. Flood, supra note 7, at 480.
8o. Id. at 479-80.
8r. DeGeer, supra note 21, at 272. In 1996, Pioneer Hi-Bred developed a GMO soybean
containing a Brazil nut gene, which increased protein content. Id. The GMO soybean thus exhibited
the allergen qualities of the Brazil nut, qualities that may be fatal in allergic humans. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Repp, supra note 9, at 587 (long term studies regarding the impact of GMO products are
unavailable).
84. See CrR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra note 8, at 8.
85. Id. at 8-9.
86. Tim Van Pelt, Note, Is Changing Patent Infringement Liability the Appropriate Mechanism for
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ground at a rate of about one foot per second, much faster than other
types of pollen8s A single corn plant produces between four and five
million particles of pollenY If even a small amount of a cornfield's pollen
drifts to nearby fields, the potential for cross-pollination can be quite
serious." Corn has been described by one scientist as "basically just
broadcasting piles of pollen out into the air and hoping it lands where it's
needed."'
For other crops, a relatively small buffer zone between GMO and
non-GMO crops may be effective to prevent unwanted pollinization.
Corn pollen, however, travels much farther distances, making buffer
zones costly, if not economically unfeasible altogether. One buyer of
organic corn seed reports that some of his growers have chosen urban
environments, like Chicago, as the safest places to grow without the risk
of contamination.9'
In 2000, pollen drift was one of the factors leading to the spread of
StarLink corn, a genetically modified corn approved only for animal
consumption.92 StarLink was planted on less than I% of the United
States corn acreage in 2000, but appeared in io% of the crop harvested
that same year.' The discovery of StarLink in human food sources led to
massive recalls of food products and plummeting export sales.94 Although
one cause of the StarLink crisis was improper handling of the crops,
experts say that pollen drift compounded the problem.95
B. THE MARKET FOR NoN-GMO FOOD PRODUCTS
Were it not for the growing importance of world markets for non-
GMO food products, the problems posed by pollen drift might not be so
acute. Defining the size of the market for non-GMO products is
complicated by the fact that no international agency keeps direct
statistics. In most cases, the market for organic products has to serve as a
Allocating the Cost of Pollen Drift?, 31 J. CoRP. L. 567,587 N.159 (2006).
87. Peter Thomison, Managing "Pollen Drift" to Minimize Contamination of Non-GMO Corn,
AGF-i5 3 , OHIO STATE UNIVERSrrY EXTENSION FACT SHEET, http://ohioline.osu.edu/agf-fact/oI53.html





. Anne Fitzgerald, Specialty Pollen Concerns Blowin' in the Wind, DES MOINES REG., Mar. 17,
2002, at Io (quoting John Nason, Assistant Professor, Iowa State University).
95. Glenn Roberts, Founder, Anson Mills, President & CEO, Carolina Gold Rice Foundation,
Address at Seeds of Resistance/Seeds of Hope Conference (Apr. 8, 2004).





proxy because, by most current definitions, organic products cannot
contain genetically modified materials.9 Counting only sales of organic
products, however, significantly undercounts the size of non-GMO
markets around the world, because many non-GMO farmers are not
organic farmers. Japan, for example, places restrictions on GMO food
products, but it does not demand that farmers grow organically. Farmers
who want to satisfy the huge demand for non-GMO soybeans and
soybean oil in Japan,7 for example, or who wish to sell in a variety of
product markets in the European Union where many GMO goods are
banned, may use synthetic pesticides, herbicides, or fertilizers to grow
their crops. A look at the growing worldwide market for organic goods
can at least set a baseline. A 2004 survey reveals that 24,070,010 hectares
are currently under organic cultivation around the world.98 In 2002, the
global market for organic food products topped $23 billion' and was
growing at a rapid rate, between 8-12% per year in Europe and North
America." From 1992 to 1997, certified organic acreage in the United
States grew by 44% and organic cropland by iii%."'° Over twelve
thousand stores in the United States specialize in selling organic foods,' 2
but conventional supermarkets have begun to market organics to a
significant extent. As of 2000, over 42% of all organic foods were sold in
chain supermarkets. 3
The market for organic foods is growing at a rapid pace, but
undoubtedly slower than the overall market for non-GMO goods.
Considering EU and Japanese restrictions on GMO imports'" and the
effect of labeling laws in those jurisdictions,' 5 farmers will have
increasing incentives to avoid planting GMO crops. Even in the United
96. See RUDY KORTBECH-OLESEN, INT'L TRADE CENTRE, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE AND
DEVJWORLD TRADE ORG., WHAT IS ORGANIC AGRICULTURE?, http://www.intracen.org/mds/slides/
organic/sldoo3.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2006).
97. See generally Richard Moore, Preserving Soybean Biodiversity in Japan: Reconsidering GMO,
Pesticide-Free, Low Input, and Organic, in SEEDS OF RESISTANCE/SEEDS OF HOPE: CROSSING BORDERS IN
THE REPATRIATION AND IN SITU CONSERVATION OF TRADITIONAL PLANTS (Virginia Nazarea & Robert
Rhoades eds., forthcoming 2o06) (on file with author) ("U.S. soybean and product exports were $8.o
billion in 2004 ... [to] Japan and Europe, where there is the most opposition to GMO products.").
98. See THE WORLD OF ORGANIC AGRICULTURE: STATISTICS AND EMERGING TRENDS 15 tbl.i (Helga
Wilier & Minou Yussefi eds., 6th rev. ed. 2004).
99. See id. at 21.
I00. See id. at 22-23.
1OI. INT'L TRADE CTR., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 7, at 209.
102. Id.
103. Id.
io4. See Repp, supra note 9, at 593 (noting that the United States lost $200 million annual export
market for corn to the European Union over a two-year period).
105. Id.
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States, the incentives are significant. A recent study reveals that in
American supermarkets, the price premium for organic versus
conventional fresh produce was from ii% to 121%. '06  At one
conventional supermarket chain, the premium price for organic produce
was 36.8%." Pollen drift poses a significant threat to farmers who wish
to take advantage of this price premium.
III. THEORIES OF TORT RECOVERY FOR NoN-GMO FARMERS
Tort law is likely to grant significant relief to bystanding farmers
who suffer harm when their crops are pollinated from GMO crops. The
three primary theories are (I) private nuisance, ' (2) strict liability,"° and
(3) trespass to land,"' and at least three other theories are possible: (4)
public nuisance,"' (5) negligence,"' and (6) interference with personal
lo6. INT'L TRADE CTR., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 7, at 215.
107. Id.
lo8. See infra notes 119-179 and accompanying text.
lO9. See infra notes 18o-235 and accompanying text.
iio. See infra notes 236-264 and accompanying text.
1II. Nuisance law distinguishes between public and private nuisances: a public nuisance affects the
safety or health of members of the general public, while a private nuisance affects individuals or a
group of individuals in some private way not felt by the public at large. Under public nuisance, the
bystanding farmer must demonstrate an unreasonable interference with a right of the general public,
coupled with special harm to plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 82IB, 821C (1979). Special
harm is easy to satisfy through proof of lost revenues when the plaintiff sells the crop. See Huggin v.
Gaffney Dev. Co., 92 S.E.2d 883, 884-85 (S.C. 1956) (finding special harm where obstruction of
roadway resulted in crop loss). The argument that GMO pollen injures the general public is harder.
The typical public nuisance involves health risks or general annoyance to the community. See WILLIAM
L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 90 (5th ed. 1984) (defining a
public nuisance as "an act or omission 'which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the
public in the exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty's subjects"'); see, e.g., Seigle v. Bromley, 124
P. 191, 195 (Colo. Ct. App. 1912) (finding interference with public health in presence of hog ranch);
State v. Chrisp, 85 N.C. 528, 534 (1881) (finding interference with public morals in use of public
profanity); King v. Kline, 6 Pa. 318, 320 (1847) (finding interference with public safety in keeping of
vicious dog); Town of Davis v. Davis, 21 S.E. 906, 909 (W. Va. 1895) (finding interference with public
peace in loud noise). If the GMO crops are approved by the government, and plaintiff does not sell
her affected crops in a market for which they are not approved, there would appear to be no health or
safety risk. However, in In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D.
II1. 2002), the court refused to grant a motion to dismiss for defendants on a public nuisance claim. Id.
at 852. Plantiffs asserted that commingling of StarLink corn after harvesting had polluted the entire
U.S. corn supply. Id. at 833. The court considered the alleged contamination of the general food supply
to be the public nuisance, not the damage to plaintiffs' individual crops. Id. at 848.
112. The negligence claims most likely to be asserted are a failure of the creator and seller of
GMO seeds to warn their purchasers of the risk of injuring neighboring GMO farmers through cross
pollination, and the failure of those parties and the GMO farmer to employ adequate buffer zones. On
occasion, some courts tie negligence and private nuisance together, but they are analytically distinct.
See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 71, at 553-57 (941). Nuisance is an
intentional tort. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note I I I, § 87, at 624. However, negligence decision-making
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property (trespass to goods or conversion)."3 We focus on the primary
theories sequentially although, as will become obvious, categories
overlap, and doctrinal confusion as to the scope of the categories and
their interrelationships is pervasive.
With respect to the substantive elements of the tort causes of action,
it makes no difference whether the farmer is a plaintiff, or instead is a
defendant asserting the action as a crossclaim or counterclaim in a patent
infringement action brought by the owner of the patent on the
neighboring GMO crops. For ease of description, we hereafter refer to
the bystanding farmer as "plaintiff." In either type of case, the
bystanding farmer must make a decision as to whom to sue. For all the
tort claims, the logical defendant is the nearby landowner whose GMO
crop has tainted the bystanding farmer's crop. Sometimes there will be
multiple defendant landowners, and sometimes the sources of the GMO
pollen will not be immediately obvious when the farmer discovers the
injury. Expert evidence, including DNA analysis,"4 may help to resolve
causation issues. If tort liability for damages exists, multiple landowner
defendants may be jointly and severally liable, or a court may apportion
liability.' 5
Neighboring GMO farmers are the primary defendants for all of the
tort actions. Involvement of other parties, including the patent owner, as
tort defendants is trickier. The bystanding farmer may assert that the
patent owner is liable for damages. When the manufacturer or seller of
patented seeds is someone other than the patent owner (as is often the
case), the seed manufacturer or seller is another potential tort defendant.
Compared to the primary defendants, different legal analysis applies with
respect to these "secondary defendants" who are involved in the
inventing, promoting, and marketing of GMO products. The patent
owner and seed seller are likely to defend on the basis that they lose
control of the seeds when they are delivered to purchasing farmers."6
They do not make decisions as to planting or cultivation of the crops, or
the use of buffer zones near boundary lines. They are not aware of the
farmers' local conditions, including wind patterns and the presence of
nearby organic or other non-GMO farmers. Such defenses have
closely resembles nuisance balancing. Compare id. § 3', at 169-74 with id. § 87, at 629-30.
113. See infra notes 26o-264 and accompanying text.
I 54. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
115. If a bystanding farmer asserts a counterclaim in a patent infringement case, the GMO farmers
will not be parties in the original action. The farmer may have to add one or more GMO farmers as
cross-defendants.
116. See StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 845.
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sometimes succeeded when farmers have asserted claims for crop
damage from drift of herbicides and pesticides against manufacturers and
sellers. Courts have reasoned that improper application of those products
by other persons (the farmer or someone hired to apply the product)
caused the harm-not the products themselves, which are safe if properly
used."7
Conversely, secondary defendants, but not the end users of the
product (the GMO farmers), may have tort liability if the underlying
theory is negligence., 8 The secondary defendants may have a greater
appreciation of the risks that their GMO product poses to nearby non-
GMO farmers than the GMO farmers who buy and plant the patented
seeds. Their superior knowledge would mean that, under standard tort
law principles, they may have a duty to warn the GMO farmers of the
risks and how to control, manage, and minimize those risks by, for
example, leaving appropriate buffer zones. A failure to warn, or
inadequate warning, might be grounds for negligence-based liability on
the secondary defendants, even when the injured party is not the seed
buyer, but a bystander.
A. PRIVATE NUISANCE
Today nuisance is the most common legal remedy for activities that
adversely affect a property owner's land."9 Of the various tort theories,
nuisance provides pollen drift plaintiffs with the best opportunity for
recovery. All injured bystanding farmers should not necessarily recover.
Nuisance liability for pollen pollution should attach under a balancing
approach that examines a multitude of facts that are particular to both of
the farming operations. 2° This regime allows courts to fashion liability
rules that are responsive to efficiency considerations, including switching
costs and the role that transaction costs may place in blocking wealth-
enhancing exchanges by the parties. 2 '
Nuisance law is highly flexible and adaptable. With that virtue comes
indeterminacy. Nuisance law, long ago called by Prosser an
"impenetrable jungle,' .... is riddled with uncertainty. Not only do courts
differ as to the overall scope of the field, they display markedly different
17. See, e.g., Braly v. Midvalley Chem. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 366, 368 (Dist. Ct. App. i96i) (finding
that fertilizer was, like other similar substances, only dangerous when applied excessively).
I 8. See supra note 112.
I59. See JACQUELINE P. HAND & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, NEIGHBORING PROPERTY OWNERS 14 (1988).
12o. See infra Part III.A.3.
t21. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
122. PROSSER, supra note 112, § 71, at 549.
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ideas about the nature of the landowner's right that ought to be
protected by nuisance. Due to the amorphous nature of nuisance, there is
more state-by-state variation in legal approach than for most other basic
fields of tort law. Therefore, we base the following discussion on some
general propositions for which there is broad, but far from universal,
consensus.
Nuisance is often said to be a relative concept-it is a relative tort, it
gives rise to a relative property right. It balances the gravity of the injury
to the plaintiff against the utility of the defendant's conduct to arrive at a
judgment as to whether a nuisance has taken place.'23 This oversimplifies,
but a core of relativity does exist. When a set of facts falls within the
core, balancing (by the court, the finder of fact, or both) takes place. The
defendant's conduct is found to be a nuisance if it is said to be
unreasonable, considering all the facts and circumstances, including the
plaintiff's position.
Nuisance, however, has two other zones, lying on opposite sides of
the balancing core. These zones may ultimately either insulate the
defendant from liability, or may impose liability on the defendant
regardless of the reasonableness of the activity. Both of these zones give
us bright-line rules. The first zone is what we may call nuisance immunity.
Certain landowner activities are regarded as sufficiently beneficial or
benign that courts virtually never castigate them as nuisances. Such
activities are privileged and are not subject to nuisance balancing. An
important caveat is that for some types of activities the landowner must
conduct the activity in a non-negligent fashion. In a case falling within
the nuisance immunity zone, the defendant is free from nuisance liability.
Second, there is the nuisance per se doctrine. Certain conduct,
perceived as generally undesirable or high risk, is always wrongful. If an
owner or possessor of land has engaged in that conduct, a neighbor can
get relief (enjoin the nuisance or collect damages), without the need to
prove that the conduct is unreasonable. Nuisance per se is properly seen
as a species of strict liability, even though many courts choose not to
discuss it in those terms. We also discuss nuisance per se later in
connection with strict liability.'24
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979).
124. See infra notes 221-225 and accompanying text.
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Nuisance Nuisance Per Se: Strict
Immunity Liability
i. Immunity Cases
Different types of activities qualify for nuisance immunity. One
example is the refusal of American courts to grant relief for
improvements that block views ' or deprive a neighbor of sunlight or
air. 16 Another is the doctrine of aesthetic nuisance, which holds that
improvements or landscape modifications cannot constitute a nuisance if
the only harm to neighbors is aesthetic blight.' 7 Thus, the ugliest grain
silo in the world, even when located next to a neighbor's boundary and
shadowing her sundeck, is not actionable.
For our purposes, a small body of old cases involving noxious plants,
sometimes judicially identified as "weeds," provides the closest analogy.
These cases immunized owners of weed-infested properties from
nuisance liability when the weeds germinated and "polluted" nearby
crops. In a representative case, an Iowa court held that a farmer whose
lands were "greatly damaged" by a cocklebur infestation had no cause of
action.'29 The line of authority in the case reports died out close to a
125. See, e.g., 44 Plaza, Inc. v. Gray-Pac Land Co., 845 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
("[Liandowner's otherwise lawful acts in blocking the view of another's property do not give rise to a
cause of action for nuisance."); Hay v. Weber, 48 N.W. 859, 860 (Wis. 189 i ) (holding obstruction of
view is "too remote and speculative to constitute the basis of a private action" for nuisance).
126. See, e.g., Sher v. Leiderman, 226 Cal. Rptr. 698,701 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[Bllockage of light to a
neighbor's property, except in cases where malice is the overriding motive, does not constitute
actionable nuisance, regardless of the impact on the injured party's property or person.").
127. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Brown, 65 A. 56, 521 (Me. 19o6) (holding unsightly wharf not
infringement on neighbor's legal rights); Perry Mount Park Cemetary Ass'n v. Netzal, 264 N.W. 303,
303 (Mich. 1936) ("[M]ere esthetics is beyond the power of the court to regulate."); Ness v. Albert, 665
S.W.2d i, 1-2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) ("[U]nsightliness, without more, does not create an actionable
nuisance."); Houston Gas & Fuel Co. v. Harlow, 297 S.W. 570, 572 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) (holding
unsightly structure does not constitute nuisance); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 191
S.E. 368, 369 (W. Va. 1937) ("[Clourts of equity have hesitated to exercise authority in the abatement
of nuisances where the subject matter is objected to by the complainants merely because it is offensive
to the sight.").
128. See, e.g., James Charles Smith, The Law of Yards, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 203, 215 n.47 (2006)
(cellular tower towering over neighboring property is not actionable).
129. In Harndon v. Stultz, ioo N.W. 851, 852 (Iowa 19o4), defendant "allowed cocklebur and other
noxious weeds to grow in large quantities" near the boundary line. Due to wind and a natural
watercourse, the weed spread to plaintiff's lands, "whereby the same has been greatly damaged." Id.
Rejecting plaintiff's claim for damages and an injunction, the court observed, without further analysis:
"The proposition is unique, to say the least. It is not suggested that the growing by one upon his own
land of cocklebur and weeds is without legal right ... " Id.
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century ago, probably for two reasons. First, the common-law nuisance
no-duty-to-control-weeds rule became entrenched. New challenges by
injured landowners may have seemed pointless. Second, and more
importantly, the no-duty rule led to legislative intervention. Local
governments first enacted weed control ordinances during the late
nineteenth century to protect farmers' crops from the spread of weeds.'30
Subsequently, weed ordinances spread to urban and suburban settings. 3'
At first blush, the noxious plant cases might support immunizing the
GMO crop defendants from liability. Both fact patterns involve an
invasion by reproductive parts of plants: seeds and pollen. There are,
however, two critical distinctions. First, some courts have considered
relevant the question whether the plants on the defendant's land grew
accidentally, or whether the defendant purposely planted them. English
cases involving poisonous trees and thistles illustrate the distinction.
Landowners who plant yew trees are liable in nuisance for harm to
livestock if branches and leaves project over the boundary.3 ' But
landowners who allow thistles to grow on their land are not liable when
they spread, injuring a neighbor's land.'33 The general principle is the
familiar one that discriminates between a person's action and inaction.
This rests on the commonsense notion that ordering a person to take
preventative measures is more onerous than ordering a person to stop
doing something that injures another person. With respect to the
bystanding farmer, the prototypical defendant has intentionally planted
the GMO crops. The GMO crops are not weeds that accidentally
infiltrated the defendant's land.
A second distinction between the noxious plant cases and GMO
pollen drift concerns the legal status of the invading substances. In the
130. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 8-3-7-I (LexisNexis 1998); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6401
(Vernon 1926); see also Chicago, Terre Haute & Se. Ry. v. Anderson, 242 U.S. 283, 288 (1916)
(upholding constitutionality of Indiana law); Mo, Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)
(upholding Texas law). These statutes usually delegated to local government the power to enact
ordinances specifying the types of prohibited vegetation, the landowner's duty to eliminate them,
procedures for official notice to offending landowners, and enforcement mechanisms.
131. See Smith, supra note 128, at 217.
132. Crowhurst v. Burial Bd., (1878) 4 Exch. Div. 5, 6 (plaintiff's horse died from eating yew tree
leaves). Distinguishing Crowhurst, the court in Ponting v. Noakes, (r894) 2 Q.B.D. 28t, 291, denied
recovery when plaintiff's colt extended its head across a boundary fence to eat leaves that were wholly
on defendant's land. The English courts viewed the cases as raising questions about the scope of
Rylands v. Fletcher, (i868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.). In the former, but not the latter case, the
defendant allowed a dangerous thing to escape from his land.
133. Giles v. Walker, (189o) 24 Q.B.D. 656 (after defendant burned gorse to improve land for
grazing, numerous thistles emerged; jury found defendant to be negligent, but appellate court
reversed).
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noxious plant cases, as in standard pollution cases, the defendant polluter
does not assert an ownership interest in the emitted material.'34 Certainly,
these substances were owned by the polluter prior to their escape from
the polluter's land. Afterwards, legal ownership is abandoned. In the
usual cases pollutants like weed seeds and pollen, leaves, dirt, dust, or
smoke almost invariably have no value. But if a victim of pollution can
"harvest the pollution" and find an economically valuable use for it, she
is free to keep the substance. Surely the polluter, as original owner,
cannot get it back and has no claim for compensation. Suppose a
landowner's operations propitiously emit gold dust through the air or
water, which a neighbor captures. Now it's her property.
Conversely, retained ownership of a thing that enters a neighbor's
tract generally makes the owner liable for damages. This is why owners
of domesticated animals are usually strictly liable when they stray, and
why in contrast, landowners are not liable if unconstrained wild animals
exit their land and damage a neighbor's land.' If owners of wandering
livestock forfeited ownership of their animals to the neighbors, perhaps
the neighbors would not have damage actions. In many cases, the victims
of animal trespass would consider the exchange a fair quid pro quo; the
animals' value would equal or exceed the injury caused by the animals. I"6
In the GMO pollination situation, the defendant who holds a valid
patent is like the owner of straying domestic animals. The GMO farmer
is sending a substance on her neighbor's land, but the patentee still
claims to retain ownership of it. Due to patent law, the neighboring
farmer cannot feel free to use the pollen however she sees fit. Just as a
neighbor cannot capture and sell livestock that have entered her land,
she cannot intentionally capture and utilize the patented pollen.'37
Because of the three-party nature of the pollen drift scenario, the
134. See Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Oakes, 58 S.W. 999, oot (Tex. i9oo) (pointing out that after
Bermuda grass invades neighbor's land, neighbor owns it completely, and can do with it what he
pleases).
135. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note ii, § 76.
136. A classic case dealing with migrating oil and gas demonstrates the impact on liability of the
decision as to whether the original owner has retained ownership of the escaped property. Hammonds
v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Ky. Ct. App. 1934) (holding that company that
reinjects natural gas into depleted underground reservoir is not liable in trespass to neighbors who
own part of reservoir because company has lost ownership of gas, which is like wild animal released
into natural habitat).
537. It makes no difference that the GMO crop farmer lacks the contractual right to let her
neighbor use the patented goods that have escaped. First, in buying seeds, she bargained for limited
rights to use the patent. Second, the patent owner will often be a co-defendant, and that owner could




retained ownership distinction made in the old wandering livestock cases
is not precisely on point. Nonetheless, we feel relatively certain that
common-law principles do not justify granting nuisance immunity to
GMO defendants, especially in light of a recent pollen drift case that
applies a balancing approach. 3 This means that in nuisance litigation,
defendants are not entitled to summary judgment, provided plaintiffs
have alleged, and can introduce evidence of, substantial harm and
causation (i.e., that defendants are the source of the offending GMO
pollen).
2. Right-to-Farm Acts
Although GMO defendants have no plausible claim to common-law
nuisance immunity, a legislature may choose to confer immunity,
provided it acts in a constitutionally valid manner.'39 Since the 1970s, all
states have enacted right-to-farm statutes' 4 that shield agricultural
operations from nuisance liability under certain circumstances. Despite
the substantial diversity among the states in statutory content, as well as
divergences in judicial interpretation, few GMO defendants will be able
successfully to invoke a right-to-farm statute as an affirmative defense.
Right-to-farm laws protect farms from nuisance liability by
insulating existing farm operations when a nuisance arises from the
changing nature of the surrounding area. 4' The prototypical conflict
addressed by right-to-farm acts involves a homeowner, recently resettled
from the city or suburbs, complaining about agricultural odors or other
agricultural externalities. The right-to-farm law enacts a "coming to the
nuisance" defense, preserving existing agricultural uses, no matter how
fervently the city slickers complain that they cannot enjoy their newly
acquired properties."4 Because right-to-farm laws are targeted at these
specific factual situations, some courts have held that right-to-farm acts
138. In In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. I11. 2002), the
liability of neighboring farmers on nuisance grounds seems to be taken for granted in the larger
discussion of whether GMO seed distributors and manufacturers are liable. Id. at 844-45.
139. See Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 321 (Iowa 1998) (concluding that local
government's approval of agricultural area designation for 960 acres, which entitles owners to
statutory immunity, is unconstitutional taking of neighbors' property). In addition, an extensive
legislative grant of immunity to GMO defendants might violate federal due process. See John C.P.
Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress
of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 540 (2005).
140. See Alexander A. Reinert, Note, The Right to Farm: Hog-Tied and Nuisance-Bound, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1694, 17o6 n.76 (1998) (citing fifty state statutes).
141. Grossman, supra note 9, at 233-34.
142. See id. (arguing that those who come to the nuisance have only themselves to blame (citing
Reinert, supra note 14o, at 1703)).
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do not apply to actions brought by agricultural plaintiffs.'43 It is also
generally likely that the complaining farmer will have historically used
his neighboring land for farming purposes, thus not changing the nature
of the surrounding area.'" In other words, when farmers sue farmers, the
common law often applies; there is no statutory immunity. A Washington
case is illustrative. In Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd. Partnership,'45
farm owners brought a nuisance action complaining about manure dust,
flies, and odors from a neighboring cattle feedlot and meat processing
plant, both of which had recently expanded in scale of operation.1
6
Finding the Washington right-to-farm statute to be ambiguous, the court
interpreted it to apply only to conflicts stemming from urban
encroachment. 147 Thus, it did not immunize agricultural enterprises from
nuisance actions brought by an agricultural or other rural plaintiff.14 In
contrast, a California court concluded that its state right-to-farm act
conferred immunity upon a rice farmer when a neighboring plaintiff
farmer complained that the rice farming caused excessive water seepage,
damaging plaintiff's row crops. '
A number of other requirements for statutory immunity may
disqualify some GMO defendants. First, the GMO farming activity may
have to meet a minimum time period for operation before it achieves
immunity. In California, the period is three years.'," Second, if the
bystanding farmer's use commenced prior to the GMO farming,
immunity is unlikely.,'" This factor, which reflects the "coming to the
nuisance" origin of the right-to-farm acts, often will have a decisive
impact.'52 Frequently the bystanding farmer will have begun organic or
143. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd., 952 P.2d 6io, 614 (Wash. 1998) (interpreting
Washington's statute as requiring a non-agricultural plaintiff). But see Souza v. Lauppe, 69 Cal. Rptr.
2d 494, 496 (Ct. App. 1997) (construing California's statute to apply to cases with either non-
agricultural or agricultural plaintiffs).
144. Grossman, supra note 9, at 234 (arguing that a suit against a GMO farmer will usually be
brought by a neighboring farmer who grows traditional crops).
145. 9 5 2 P.2d 61o.
146. Id. at61i-12.
147. Id. at 614.
148. Id. at 616.
149. Souza, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494 (affirming summary judgment for the defendant because the
state right-to-farm statute applies broadly to bar a nuisance action resulting from changed conditions).
15o. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3482.5(a) (West 1997); Souza, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496-98, 500.
15i. For example, the Vermont right-to-farm statute protects agricultural activities that are
"established prior to surrounding nonagricultural activities." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5753 (2002 &
Supp. 2005).
152. In Souza, the plaintiff's recent switch from rice farming to row crops constituted the required
statutory "changed condition in or about the locality." 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5o-o1 (citing
§ 3482.5(a)(I)). In Buchanan, the court counted in the plaintiffs' favor their ownership and operation
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non-GMO farming before, sometimes long before, the defendant
introduced GMO crops to the neighborhood. Third, the defendant's
agricultural use may have to meet industry standards.'53 Compliance with
federal regulations may not suffice. The Michigan act points to state
regulatory norms.'54 The California statute is more diffuse, pointing to
undefined local norms.'55 This probably means that no immunity is
available unless GMO farming is commonly practiced in the locality. If it
is rare (e.g., the defendant is the only local GMO farmer), by definition
defendant has departed from the industry standard.
3. Nuisance Balancing
Nuisance's large middle zone, classically called nuisance per accidens
(in contrast to the bright-line nuisance per se rule), balances a number of
factors to determine which party has a property entitlement. Often but
not always the decision-maker is the jury or other trier-of-fact; whether a
nuisance exists is said to be a mixed question of fact and law."s6 The
nature of the balancing test is flexible enough to allow a court to consider
of their farm since 1961, noting that "it is the Buchanan family farm that is being forced out by the
expanding cattle feedlot and industrial-like beef processing facility." 952 P.2d at 613. The court
concluded that the statute "should not be read to insulate agricultural enterprises from nuisance
actions brought by an agricultural or other rural plaintiff, especially if the plaintiff occupied the land
before the nuisance activity was established." Id. at 616; accord Trickett v. Ochs, 838 A.2d 66 (Vt.
2003) (holding that operators of an apple orchard, who expanded their activities by adding on-site
facilities for apple waxing and storage, are not entitled to statutory immunity when the buyers of a
farmhouse brought an action alleging nuisance).
153. Some right-to-farm acts expressly provide that the defendant's activity must be conducted
without negligence. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-3o-6-9(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005) ("This section
does not apply if a nuisance results from the negligent operation of an agricultural or industrial
operation or its appurtenances."). Often this will serve as a proxy for compliance with industry custom
and standards.
154. MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.473(3)(I) (West 2003) provides:
A farm or farm operation shall not be found to be a public or private nuisance if the farm or
farm operation alleged to be a nuisance conforms to generally accepted agricultural and
management practices according to policy determined by the Michigan commission of
agriculture. Generally accepted agricultural and management practices shall be reviewed
annually by the Michigan commission of agriculture and revised as considered necessary.
155. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3482.5(a)(I) (West 1997) (emphasis added) provides:
No agricultural activity, operation, or facility, or appurtenances thereof, conducted or
maintained for commercial purposes, and in a manner consistent with proper and accepted
customs and standards, as established and followed by similar agricultural operations in the
same locality, shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, due to any changed condition
in or about the locality, after it has been in operation for more than three years if it was not
a nuisance at the time it began.
156. See, e.g., Escobar v. Cont'l Baking Co., 596 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (reversing
trial court conclusion that nighttime noise from deliveries to bakery was unreasonable and thus
nuisance because nuisance is a "mixed question of law and fact" (quoting Melrose Hous. Auth. v. N.H.
Ins. Co., 520 N.E.2d 493,497 n.4 (Mass. 1998))).
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the factors relevant to liability identified in Part I of this Article, e.g.,
farming methods, typical crop yields, costs of production, market values,
the availability of alternative seeds and protective measures, and the
magnitude of each farmer's switching costs.'57 This is not to say that
judges will inevitably render wealth-enhancing decisions, but the
balancing approach authorizes the use of the economic tools necessary
for efficient results.
In the nineteenth century, American courts began to depart from the
classic view of nuisance, which held a defendant liable for all substantial
harms caused by its invasions.' 58 Industrialization gave rise to a growing
numbers of conflicts between industrial defendants and their
neighbors. 59 Judges became reluctant to assess damages against emerging
industries, ' and they avoided damage liability by refocusing nuisance
doctrine. 6 ' If the defendant was acting reasonably in devoting its land to
an industrial activity, the defendant was privileged to continue without• • 162
having to pay its neighbors. This new perspective led to the modern,
expanded view of reasonableness.' A nuisance exists only if the gravity
of the harm outweighs the benefits flowing from the defendant's
conduct. '64
The Restatement of Torts follows the modern, post-industrial view
and applies a reasonableness filter to both parties' conduct. With respect
to the gravity of the harm, it calls for evaluation of:
(a) The extent of the harm involved; (b) the character of the harm
involved; (c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or
enjoyment invaded; (d) the suitability of the particular use or
enjoyment invaded to the character of the locality; and (e) the burden
on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.' 65
With respect to the utility of the defendant's conduct, the
Restatement points to: "(a) the social value that the law attaches to the
primary purpose of the conduct; (b) the suitability of the conduct to the
character of the locality; and (c) the impracticability of preventing or
157. See supra Part I.








165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (I979).
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avoiding the invasion."' 66
The Restatement approach may have the virtue of being flexible and
adaptable, but it does not compel any particular result in any imaginable
nuisance dispute. Multi-factor analysis incorporating these eight
variables produces a level of indeterminacy that is difficult to surpass.67
However, the flexibility inherent in the approach allows for the
incorporation of the economically relevant factors we have identified. As
Coase noted after his discussion of common law nuisance cases taking a
balancing approach, "[t]he economic problem in all cases of harmful
effects is how to maximize the value of production .... [and] the courts
have often recognized the economic implications of their decision and
are aware 6 as many economists are not) of the reciprocal nature of the
problem."
6
In justifying their outcomes, modern courts have often applied the
Restatement nuisance criteria. To the extent that nuisance law has a
modicum of certainty and predictability, it comes from outside the
Restatement from reported cases. This means that trial courts and
appellate courts are constrained in their nuisance decision-making only
by in-state judicial precedents. This is especially significant for the issue
at hand-under modern nuisance balancing, will courts (should courts?)
find GMO defendants liable when their pollen contaminates the crops of
bystanding farmers? Because there are no judicial precedents, the
question is wide open. Any competent judge can write an opinion, using
the Restatement factors (or equally malleable factors set forth in state
decisional law) to announce or to reject liability, or to validate a jury
verdict in either direction. This, of course, creates room for the
consideration of farming methods, typical crop yields, costs of
production, market values, the availability of alternative seeds and
166. Id.
167. Many scholars see legal indeterminacy as a vice. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad-
Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697 (1988) (arguing that formal principles in
the context of takings are more desirable than a less formal balancing approach). Others see it as a
virtue, at least in some contexts. See Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 94 (2OO2) (arguing that in context of takings and nuisance law, vagueness and
chaos are "precisely what enables them to anchor civil society's ongoing social process of creating and
revising other, more crystallized expressions of property law").
168. COASE, supra note 2, at 114,120.
Furthermore, from time to time, [the courts] take these economic implications into account,
along with other factors, in arriving at their decisions. The American writers [citing Prosser]
on this subject refer to the question in a more explicit fashion than do the British.... And
in the reports of individual cases, it is clear that the judges have had in mind what would be
lost as well as what would be gained ....
Id. at 120-21.
[VOL. 58:87
THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST
protective measures, and the magnitude of each farmer's switching costs,
which should be relevant in determining liability.
Doctrinal indeterminacy has one highly important consequence for
GMO nuisance litigation. Although some of the Restatement
considerations do not raise issues that are purely factual (some present
mixed questions of fact and law), in almost every case fact-finding will be
necessary. Cases will survive motions for summary judgment and
proceed to the jury (or to the court as fact-finder if there is no jury). A
summary dismissal will take place only when the bystanding farmer sued
the wrong defendant or has failed to allege substantial economic harm
caused by cross-pollination.
The one reported American case, In re StarLink Corn Products
Liability Litigation, demonstrates how easily bystanding farmers can
survive the summary judgment stage.6 ' Corn farmers brought actions
against the developer and distributor of StarLink corn, asserting multiple
claims including private nuisance, public nuisance, negligence, strict
liability, and conversion. "' The plaintiffs did not, however, sue the
nearby StarLink corn farmers."'
StarLink corn is genetically engineered to produce a protein, Cry9C,
that is toxic to certain insects. 7 ' Because Cry9C has an attribute similar
to human allergens, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
approved StarLink for animal feed and other uses, but not for human
consumption."3  Due to cross pollination, StarLink allegedly
contaminated "the entire United States' corn supply," causing a drop in
value of U.S. corn.
74
The StarLink district court dismissed certain claims, but not the
nuisance claims. "' The court cursorily observed, "We agree that drifting
pollen can constitute an invasion, and that contaminating neighbors'
crops interferes with their enjoyment of the land. The issue is whether
defendants are responsible for contamination caused by their product
beyond the point of sale."'' I 6 The court assumed, without further
discussion, that the StarLink plaintiffs could assert a valid nuisance claim
169. 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. I1. 2002).
170. Id. at 833.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 833-34.
173. Id. at 834.
174. Id. at 833.
175. Id. at 847, 852.
176. Id. at 845. To the same effect, later in the opinion the court observed, "[riesidue from a
product drifting across property lines presents a typical nuisance claim." Id. at 847.
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against their neighbors. 7  All of the court's attention was directed to
defendants' claim "that they cannot be liable for any nuisance caused by
StarLink because they were no longer in control of the seeds once they
were sold to farmers.',17 The court denied the motion to dismiss,
concluding that defendants' design of the StarLink technology,
distribution of the seeds, and an alleged failure to comply with EPA
requirements might constitute substantial contribution to the nuisance.
79
B. STRICT LIABILITY
Another potential cause of action available to non-GMO farmers is
strict liability resulting from activities of the defendant that are deemed
"abnormally dangerous."' In theory, strict liability requires no fuzzy
balancing of interests, no negligence on the part of a defendant, and no
bad intent on the part of the defendant. Where applicable, it might
provide another useful legal tool for bystanding farmers.
There is no ready answer to the question whether private nuisance,
in whole or in part, is a strict liability tort. It turns on two variables: how
broadly one defines "nuisance" and how one perceives "strict liability."
The Restatement authors define nuisance expansively as any
"nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land."'' Other authorities define nuisance more narrowly,
as an intentional tort.s2 One view of strict liability limits that field to
harms caused accidentally and without negligence.' For our purposes,
these questions of theory and doctrinal definition make no practical
difference. Since the American acceptance of Rylands v. Fletcher,' it has
177. Id. at 847.
178. Id. at 845.
179. Id. at 844-47. The court discussed cases involving asbestos and guns, where some courts
imposed but others rejected nuisance liability for manufacturers beyond the point of sale. Id. at 845.
The court concluded that the StarLink nuisance claim was stronger because the asbestos and gun cases
did not involve injuries to neighbors of purchasers of the product. Id. at 846-47.
18o. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977); accord Endres, supra note 21, at 488
(observing strict liability applies when a defendant engages in an abnormally dangerous activity);
Repp, supra note 9, at 616-20 (discussing the application of strict liability for abnormally dangerous
GMO farming activities).
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979).
182. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note i I I, § 91.
183. Id. § 75, at 534-36.
184. (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.) (identifying in English courts the doctrine of strict
liability for inherently dangerous activities). Shortly after the Rylands decision, some American courts
rejected the doctrine. See, e.g., Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 450 (1873) (calling absolute liability not
suitable for a society with "modem, progressive, industrial pursuits"). For a modern example of the
American application of the Rylands doctrine, see Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972).
For a discussion of the several landmark strict liability torts cases, see R. Perry Sentell, jr., Torts in
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been abundantly clear that one landowner can be strictly liable for harm
caused to a neighbor, whether the rule is seen as a species of nuisance or
just plain strict liability.
The strict liability theory is attractive to bystanding farmers because,
unlike a negligence theory, strict liability does not require proof of fault
so long as the activity is considered abnormally dangerous.' s The
rationale behind the doctrine of strict liability is that there are certain
activities that present such serious danger that persons engaging in those
activities should automatically bear the costs of any injury resulting
therefrom.
86
To determine whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the
Restatement calls for courts to consider six factors:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it
will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of
reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of
common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where
it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the community is
outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
87
Courts should consider all six factors, but some factors may weigh
more heavily than others and it is not required that all six be present. '88
Although the theory of strict liability has been used less frequently than
other theories of recovery because the six elements are somewhat
difficult to prove, it remains a viable and attractive option to the plaintiff,
simply because a finding of strict liability ensures recovery without any
proof of fault.""9
Conceivably, those who participate in the production of GMO crops
might sometimes be held strictly liable for losses caused to neighbors
under the Rylands doctrine or its Restatement six-factor derivative.'" To
Verse: The Foundational Cases, 39 GA. L. REV. 1197, 1312-25 (2005).
185. See Flood, supra note 7, at 487-88 ("Examples of abnormally dangerous activities include
'storing and using explosives, spraying pesticides, spilling toxic substances, allowing the escape of
sewage, and allowing the escape of noxious or poisonous gases, fumes or vapors."' (quoting Repp,
supra note 9, at 616)).
186. Id. at 488.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
88. See Endres, supra note 21, at 488.
189. See Repp, supra note 9, at 617.
19o. The Restatement standard is as follows:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to
the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised
the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the
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illustrate application of the six factors in pollen drift cases, the pesticide
drift cases provide an analogy.' 9' Two of the leading cases, one from
Washington and the other from Wisconsin, reached opposite conclusions.
In Langan v. Valicopters, Inc.,9 ' pesticides applied by helicopter drifted
across a farm boundary, falling on the plaintiffs' organic crops.
Laboratory testing proved that the crops were contaminated with
Thiodan, a chemical used to prevent Colorado beetle infestations, and
resulted in the decertification of the plaintiffs' entire crop of tomatoes
and beans as eligible for sale as organic produce.'93 The plaintiffs
recovered compensatory damages in the amount of $5500 for the market
value of the crops based on a jury instruction calling for strict liability for
damage proximately caused by the pesticides."9 The Supreme Court of
Washington affirmed, applying the Restatement strict liability factors' 5
as discussed in the following sections.
i. Risk of Harm
The Langan court found it "undisputed" that crop dusting did
present a high degree of risk of harm. 96 It concluded that the practice
presented three "uncertain and uncontrollable factors: (i) the size of the
dust or spray particles; (2) the air disturbances created by the
[applicating aircraft]; and (3) natural atmospheric forces."' The court
noted that it is virtually impossible to control or limit the risk of drift
posed by crop dusting.' 9 It seems likely that a court would recognize
similar "uncertain and uncontrollable factors" in the pollen drift
situation: (i) the size of the pollen particles is very small, like pesticides;
and (2) pollen drifts in the air by way of "normal atmospheric forces"
such as wind, as do pesticides.' Like crop dusting, the planting of GMO
activity abnormally dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
191. See Robert F. Blomquist, Applying Pesticides: Toward Reconceptualizing Liability to
Neighbors for Crop, Livestock and Personal Damages from Agricultural Chemical Drift, 48 OKLA. L.
REv. 393,397-412 (995) (discussing pesticide drift cases).
192. 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977).
193. Id. at 219-20.
194. Id. at 220. The trial court gave the following instruction: "[ilf you find that defendants'
chemicals fell upon plaintiffs' crops, you are instructed that as a matter of law the defendants are liable
for such damage to plaintiffs' crops, if any, as you find was proximately caused by defendants' spray
application." Id.
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
196. Langan, 567 P.2d at 222.
197. Id.
198. Id. (referring to article which notes that use of helicopters reduces but does not eliminate risk
of drift).
199. See Flood, supra note 7, at 489.
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seeds bears a high risk of harm that cannot be eliminated because the
contamination is aided by natural uncontrollable forces like wind and
insect pollination.2
2. Likelihood of Great Harm
In determining whether the gravity of the harm will be great, the
Langan court noted that it is important to consider the use of the
adjoining land."' In other words, in order for there to be great harm, the
adjoining landowner must use her land in such a way that the chemicals
will cause harm."' For example, where an adjoining landowner keeps
hogs on the property, the likelihood of harm resulting from the
neighbor's dusting of arsenical is great."° The Langan court found that in
the plaintiffs' situation, there was the likelihood for great harm because
the organic farmer risks losing his certification if nonorganic materials
are applied to the crops. 4 Without the certification, the farmer would
suffer economic damages when he could not sell the crops in the organic
market.
The court's analysis of the likelihood of great harm for the organic
farmer is analogous to that which would apply in a pollen drift scenario.
Under the various rules governing the certification of organic crops,
genetic contamination equates to the application of nonorganic materials
to the crops; "[clurrently, 'no private or governmental certification
program for organic food allows use of GMO seeds."' 5 Thus, the
organic farmer whose crops are GMO-contaminated could easily prove
the gravity of the harm by way of his economic losses.
3. Exercise of Reasonable Care
Concerning the defendants' inability to eliminate the risk by the
exercise of reasonable care, the Langan court simply noted that the same
factors that produced a high degree of risk of harm were not possibly
eliminated by the use of reasonable care °6 In the context of corn pollen
drift, GMO farmers probably similarly cannot completely eliminate the
high risk of harm. With a crop like soybeans, however, GMO farmers
may be able to employ small, effective buffer zones. Thus, it is likely that
200. Id.
201. Langan, 567 P.2d at 222.
202. Id.
203. Id. (citing McPherson v. Billington, 399 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)).
204. Id. at 222-23.
205. Flood, supra note 7, at 490 (quoting Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Issues Shaping Society's
Acceptance of Biotechnology and Genetically Modified Organisms, 6 DRAKE J. ArRIc. L. 81, 104
(2001)).
206. Langan, 567 P.2d at 222-23.
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the use of reasonable care on the part of the GMO farmer will depend on
the type of crop planted.
4. Common Usage
In determining whether the activity was a matter of common usage,
the Langan court employed the Restatement's approach that "[a]n
activity is a matter of common usage if it is customarily carried on by the
great mass of mankind, or by many people in the community."' The
court rejected defendants' argument that crop dusting was "common
usage," militating against strict liability, observing: "Although we
recognize the prevalence of crop dusting and acknowledge that it is
ordinarily done in large portions of the Yakima Valley, it is carried on by
only a comparatively small number of persons (approximately 287
aircraft were used in 1975) . 2.0. 8Given the popularity of some GMO
crop strains,2" an argument in favor of common usage could be
supported by a defendant, especially in the case of soybeans and canola,
where 85% and 84% of acreage, respectively, is planted in GMO
strains."' °
5. Inappropriateness of Activity in the Place
In considering the element of appropriateness, the Langan court
found simply that the use of pesticides near organic farming operations is
an activity that is inappropriate in that place."' In the pollen drift
situation, the activity of planting non-GMO crops in a place where the
pollen may drift and contaminate non-GMO crops could similarly be
considered an inappropriate activity.
6. Value to Community
Although the court in Langan found that spraying pesticides was
valuable in that it increased yields and thus food production for the
community, it eventually concluded that the appropriate analyses
included a look at who was to bear the burden of even beneficial
activities." ' The plaintiffs were innocent bystanders, and balancing the
equities required the defendants, who enjoyed the benefits of the
activity, also to bear the risks."' Similarly, in the pollen drift situation, the
benefits of GMO crops to the community may include increased food
207. Id. at 223 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 5 20(i) (Tent. Draft No. io, 1964)).
208. Id.
209. See CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra note 8, at 8-9.
21o. Id.
211. Flood, supra note 7, at 491-92.
212. Id. at 492.
213. Id.
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supply, but ultimately it is the innocent bystanding non-GMO farmer
who is harmed, and it is the GMO farmer who benefits monetarily from
the GMO crops. Under the Langan approach, the GMO farmer and the
GMO biotech companies should bear the risks that accompany GMO
farming since they are the parties who profit from the operations.
Although the Langan case provides a useful strict liability analogy to
the pollen drift scenario, the fact remains that most cases brought to
recover damages caused by pesticide drift proceed on a theory of
negligence. While the case was once seen as a potential watershed
movement toward the application of strict liability to an abnormally
dangerous activity, it has in reality been embraced by few courts."4 In
one of the few reported cases to discuss strict liability, the Wisconsin high
court rejected strict liability and required a showing of negligence. In
Bennett v. Larsen Co., a corn farmer sprayed his fields with pesticides to
combat corn borers and earworms. 5 Plaintiffs were beekeepers, with
some of their hives near the corn fields.' 6 The pesticide labels indicated
that the product may kill honeybees in substantial numbers."' This
happened. The court permitted plaintiffs' negligence claim to go
forward, but rejected their claim of strict liability:
[P]esticide application to control severe pest infestations is a common
activity which is necessary to ensure healthy crop growth. Testimony
revealed that several canning companies in the Outagamie County area
each year sprayed pesticides on their corn in order to avoid the
potential complete destruction of their crops by corn borers and
earworms. We conclude that the application of pesticides is a necessary
and beneficial activity to ensure the production of adequate and
healthy food and that its value to the people of this state outweighs the
potential for harm. Accordingly, we hold that pesticide application is
not an ultrahazardous activity warranting the application of strict
liability for resulting harm.2'
214. Id. at 493.
215. 348 N.W.2d 540,545 (Wis. 1984).
216. Id. at 544.
217. Id. at 545-46.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 553. Factually, Langan is closer to our case of the bystanding farmer than Bennett. Bees
are much more mobile than crops. In Bennett, there is no evidence that defendants' pesticides left their
own fields, drifting onto plaintiffs' land. The court rejected a prior line of cases holding in favor of
pesticide appliers, stating:
[C]ourts have premised their decisions that pesticide users are not liable for damage to bees
on the sprayed property on the theory that bees are trespassers. We do not think that a
trespass analogy is correct for this situation. Bees are by nature foragers that fly to and from
fields wherever there is nectar and pollen. There are no means to keep them from foraging,
except for short periods of time, and there is no way for land possessors to prevent bees
from entering their property.
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Those jurisdictions that impose strict liability on pesticide
applicators, like Washington, are more likely to hold GMO producers
strictly liable than those jurisdictions, like Wisconsin, that refuse to do so.
One explanation for the divergence between Washington and Wisconsin
may lie in the way each state views the consideration of "common usage"
as an element in the strict liability formulation. One particular element of
importance in the GMO context is the "common usage" test. In Bennett,
the question appears to be whether it is a common practice among
agriculturalists in the community. In Langan, the question appears to be
whether applying pesticides is a common practice among the general
population in the community (like driving a car). Obviously, the test
applied could lead to substantially different results when turning to the
question whether GMO farming constitutes a common usage, which it
surely is in many agricultural communities in the United States."'
Another form of strict liability might be found in cases applying
nuisance per se, although courts rarely integrate strict liability
terminology into their opinions. When nuisance per se is found, the
defendant's conduct is deemed wrongful, with no need to balance the
utility of that conduct against the harm to the plaintiff.22" ' There is some
confusion in the cases as to whether the nuisance per se doctrine
sanctions only conduct that is bad everywhere-no matter where the
defendant's property is located-or whether it includes conduct that is
wrongful because of the nature of the neighborhood where it takes
place." For example, a crack house would be a nuisance per se due to its
Id. at 547 n.3. The Bennett court, therefore, appears not to have based its rejection of strict liability on
the location of the bees when they were poisoned. It seemingly rejects strict liability for pesticide
application as a general proposition, not limited to the context of bee deaths. Nonetheless, the
Wisconsin court plainly could hold for an organic crop farmer in a case factually like Langan,
distinguishing Bennett without having to overrule.
220. See CR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra note 8, at 8-9.
221. A finding of nuisance per se generally equates to a summary judgment case for the plaintiff.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note III, § 78, at 553-57. If the facts pleaded as to the defendant's engaging
in a particular activity are true, and the plaintiff owns a protectible property interest, then the
defendant has committed a nuisance. If plaintiff does not prove damages, however, plaintiff will be
limited to nominal damages and injunctive relief. Wallace v. Grasso, I19 S.W.3 d 567, 579-80 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2003).
222. Sometimes a distinction is made between nuisance per se, where the action constitutes a
nuisance no matter what the circumstances or where it occurs, and a nuisance per accidens, where the
action becomes a nuisance because of the surroundings in which it occurs. See, e.g., Miller v. Cudahy
Co., 592 F. Supp. 976, 1004 (D. Kan. 1984); Engle v. Scott, 114 P.2d 236, 238 (Ariz. i94i); Miniat v.
McGinnis, 762 S.W.2d 390, 391 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988); Kays v. City of Versailles, 22 S.W.2d 182, 183
(Mo. Ct. App. 1929); Twitty v. State, 354 S.E.2d 296, 301 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987); Home Sales, Inc. v.
City of N. Myrtle Beach, 382 S.E.2d 463, 468-69 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989); Suddeth v. Knight, 314 S.E.2d
II, 14-15 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Spears v. Goldberg, Ii S.E.2d 532, 533 (W. Va. 1940).
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illegality in all neighborhoods.2 "3 In contrast, a dynamite factory located
in a residential neighborhood would constitute a nuisance per se, but
probably not if that same factory is located in an industrial zone.224 It is
highly unlikely that growing GMO crops in a rural area, generally used
for or suitable for agricultural purposes, will constitute a nuisance per
se.
225
A Texas case of the same vintage as the old weed cases illustrates
the aversion some courts might have to imposing strict liability on GMO
defendants. Like the weed cases, Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co.
v. Oakes"' is a plant pollution case, but it is much closer to our problem
because it considers the spread of a cultivated plant that injures the
grower's neighbor. Long ago, Texas railways planted Bermuda grass to
protect their embankments from erosion. Bermuda grass spreads by
runners.27 Depending upon soil conditions and other factors, sometimes
it spreads aggressively.22 5  Once it invades farm fields adjoining the
railroad rights-of-way, it interferes with crops and is difficult to
eradicate. 9 At trial, the plaintiff recovered damages for the injurious
spread of Bermuda grass from the railroad's land. 3 The trial judge had
instructed the jury that the railroad was liable for the injury if it had
planted the grass and the grass, "by its nature, was calculated and liable
to spread to and upon adjacent lands, and damage and injure the
same. 2.3' On appeal, the court reversed the verdict.32 The plaintiff argued
that the absolute liability doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher supported the
trial court's instruction.33 In the words of the Rylands court, the plaintiff
claimed that Bermuda grass is a thing "which, though harmless while it
remains there, will naturally do mischief if it escape[s] out of his land." '234
223. Cf. United States v. Wade, 152 F.3d 969, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (failing to reach the
government's argument that a crack house is a nuisance per se).
224. The ultimate difference that the classification makes is not in the remedy afforded, but in the
proof required. Nuisance per se requires only proof of the act itself, while nuisance per accidens
requires proof of the act and its consequences. See Borgnemouth Realty Co. v. Gulf Soap Corp., 31 So.
2d 488, 490 (La. 1947); Robinson v. Westman, 29 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 1947).
225. Growing GMO crops in a place where one would not expect to find them (a protected
wilderness, or a small parcel in a residential neighborhood) might raise a question. However, in such
settings it is not clear who or what would suffer harm from the GMO pollen.
226. 58 S.W. 999 (Tex. 19oo).





232. Id. at iooi.
233. Id. at 999-1ooo.
234. Id. at 999.
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The Texas court, however, expressed general dissatisfaction with Rylands
as a general principle, refusing to apply it to Bermuda grass:
[W]e think it cannot be laid down as a rule of law, applicable to all
circumstances and situations, that one who plants Bermuda grass upon
his premises makes himself liable for any damage that may result to his
neighbor, nor, on the other hand, that he may not be liable under some
circumstances and conditions. As is said in some of the authorities,
there must, in such inquires where rights and interests seem to conflict,
be a balancing of them."'
A bystanding farmer in Texas, therefore, may find that she must
bring her claim under the nuisance balancing test of the Restatement,
rather than under strict liability or nuisance per se.
Our economic analysis set forth at the beginning of this Article
suggests that nuisance balancing is the most promising and proper
approach. The strict liability test may not be sensitive enough to the
variable factors that bear on wealth maximization. A strict liability
approach might save substantial judicial costs later, however, if nuisance
balancing decisions consistently establish a uniform liability rule over
time.
C. TRESPASS
The intrusion of GMO pollen across boundary lines arguably
constitutes trespass to land under the law of some states. The non-GMO
farmer may claim that the invading pollen has interfered with her right to
exclusive possession of her farmland. Despite the hope that the law of
trespass may offer non-GMO farmers, traditional definitions of the scope
of the cause of action counsel against liability in trespass. Traditionally,
courts have distinguished trespass from nuisance, defining their elements
strictly to avoid overlap between the two theories.36 A trespass consists
235. Id. at iooi. Oakes may represent a refusal to transplant the English poisonous tree cases. See
supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text. In rejecting strict liability, the Oakes court left scant
guidance as to how a trial court was to determine whether a particular Bermuda grass invasion was, or
was not, a nuisance. At the end of the opinion, the court suggested that the question should be
whether the railroad, "in planting the grass, acted as a person of ordinary prudence would have done
under the same circumstances," and that this means that "the ground of liability, if one can be shown,
would be negligence or other culpable conduct...." Oakes, 58 S.W. at 1002-03. Oakes can be
distinguished from an invasion of GMO pollen because the injured neighbor acquires complete
ownership of the invading Bermuda grass. The Oakes court mentioned this fact as a consideration:
"Grass, when it spreads upon and takes root in the adjacent soil, becomes the property of the owner
thereof and he may do with it as he will, and hence there is no direct violation of his absolute right to
the sole use and possession of his property." Id. at tooi. In contrast, as mentioned above, the
bystanding farmer does not acquire full property rights in the patented pollen.
236. The original distinction was between the original "criminal" trespass and trespass on the case.
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of an intentional, unauthorized entry of a person or a tangible object on
the land of another. '37 The invasion must be direct and the injury
immediate.3s Any other intentional interference, if wrongful, is a
nuisance.39 Trespass is commonly said to protect an owner's interest in
exclusive possession,240 while nuisance protects the owner's interest in use
and enjoyment."' It is often unclear whether courts intend this last
distinction to be an additional test, or whether it is just a way to describe
a difference in practical impact that usually flows from the two types of
interferences.
The traditional "direct and immediate" invasion requirement
probably would insulate GMO defendants from trespass liability for two
reasons. First, the passage of time between the planting of the GMO crop
and its pollination makes the harm less "immediate." Second, the wind is
an intervening force serving as the moving agent, making the invasion
less "direct." Modern commentators, however, have suggested
eliminating the "direct and immediate" requirement,4 ' and many modern
courts have agreed. 43 Thus, the process by which GMO pollen arrives on
the land of non-GMO farmers may not preclude trespass liability in some
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note iii, § 6 (explaining that distinction is between trespass for
immediate injury and case for some secondary causation). The authors state:
The classic illustration of the difference between trespass and case is that of a log thrown
into the highway. A person struck by the log as it fell could maintain trespass against the
thrower, since the injury was direct; but one who was hurt by stumbling over it as it lay in
the road could maintain, not trespass, but an action on the case.
Id.
237. Id. § 13, at 70.
238. Baumann v. Snider, 532 S.E.2d 468,472 n.4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
239. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note iii, § 13, at 70.
240. Id. (stating that trespass requirement is that invasion interferes with right of exclusive
possession).
241. Id. § 87 ("Essence of a private nuisance is an interference with the use and enjoyment of
land.").
242. The Restatement notes that "[olne is subject to liability to another for trespass ... if he
intentionally (a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do
so...." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965). A comment further explains:
In order that there may be a trespass under the rule stated in this Section, it is not necessary
that the foreign matter should be thrown directly and immediately upon the other's land. It
is enough that an act is done with knowledge that it will to a substantial certainty result in
the entry of the foreign matter. Thus one who so piles sand close to his boundary that by
force of gravity alone it slides down onto his neighbor's land, or who so builds an
embankment that during ordinary rainfalls the dirt from it is washed upon adjacent lands,
becomes a trespasser on the other's land.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. i (1965).
243. Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 224 (Mich. App. 1999) (adopting
Restatement test); Lunda v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 63, 66 (Or. App. 198o) ("Direct or indirect is
immaterial."); Repp, supra note 9, at 6oo (claiming modem view is that direct and indirect distinction




Under the modern view of trespass liability, the plaintiff farmer
would have to prove three elements: (I) invasion, (2) causation, and (3)
harm.2" With respect to the invasion itself, a key factor of GMO pollen is
its small size. Before the middle of the last century, invasions of airborne
pollutants, dust, smoke, and particulates were not trespasses. Only
tangible objects large enough to be seen by the naked eyes resulted in
trespass liability. More recently, a number of state courts have rejected
the traditional distinction, imposing liability in trespass for airborne
contaminants.24 Other courts, however, have decided to maintain the
traditional distinction.24 6 In most states, there is no modern case law.
Courts that have allowed trespass actions for the invasion of traditional
industrial pollutants obviously will be predisposed to apply the same rule
for bystanding farmers whose crops are damaged by GMO pollen.
Conversely, courts that reject trespass for industrial pollutants will
almost certainly do so for pollen.
The judicial reform to trespass law in the traditional pollution
context is often not as important as one might expect. Normally, all
trespasses to land are wrongful. For remedies, normally all victims can
get damages (including nominal damages if no actual loss is proven) and
injunctive relief if the trespass is continuing. Reformist courts, however,
have not been willing to protect landowners from pollution to that
extent. They usually choose not to give landowners the right to collect
damages, no matter how beneficial the activity that gave rise to pollution,
or the right to force the polluter to cease the activity, with no balancing
of utilities.4
The second element of the trespass action-causation by one
particular defendant GMO farmer-could prove difficult for the
bystanding farmer4 8 It is important that the non-GMO farmer prove that
244 Repp, supra note 9, at 600.
245. E.g., Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979) (stating that smelter's
emission of lead particulates and sulfoxide gases may constitute trespass); Martin v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 342 P.2d 790, 794 (Or. 1959) (holding that aluminum plant's emission of fluoride particulates is
trespass); Scanlon, supra note 7, at 6-9 (discussing various tests applied by several states in
determining whether airborne particles can result in a direct physical interference).
246. See, e.g., 602 N.W.2d at 221 (dust, noise, and vibrations from iron ore mine do not result in
trespass).
247. Borland, 369 So. 2d at 529 (stating that plaintiff must prove substantial damage). In the
leading case of Martin, 342 P.2d at 791, the consequence of allowing trespass was to allow the plaintiff
to use a six-year statute of limitations, avoiding the two-year statute applicable to nuisance.
248. Grossman, supra note 9, at 236; Repp, supra note 9, at 602-03 (explaining challenges facing
non-GMO farmers with regard to causation element).
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he himself did not introduce the GMO pollen to the non-GMO field, for
example, by planting already-contaminated seed."' Genetic testing will
likely be required to prove that the defendant, and not the plaintiff
himself, is responsible for the contamination."' In an area with a single
GMO farming operation, genetic testing will be likely to successfully
prove whether the singular defendant is responsible. However, if there
are many GMO operations in the surrounding areas, the testing will
likely not be accurate enough to prove causation. 5' Circumstantial
evidence in the form of expert testimony will be necessary to prove the
causation element. 52
Finally, the plaintiff farmer must prove the third element of trespass,
actual damages, in order to prevail in his action. 53 The plaintiff can do
this in a number ways. He may, of course, offer evidence to prove that
the contamination resulted in actual crop failure or damage. 4
He could also show that his land has been damaged such that it is
unfit for its prior intended purpose. 55 Where the plaintiff is an organic
farmer, he may follow this line of proof in alleging that his land has been
harmed such that subsequent harvests are not marketable under the
strict standards of the industry.25 6
In cases seeking recoveries for the unwanted spraying of pesticides
and herbicides, plaintiffs have focused on negligence and strict liability.
Rarely have they advanced trespass claims. One exception is Schronk v.
Gilliam,"s7 in which defendants' airplane flew over plaintiffs' land,
249. Repp, supra note 9, at 603.
250. See Amelia P. Nelson, Legal Liability In The Wake of StarLink'm: Who Pays In The End?, 7
DRAKE J. Aoiuc. L. 241. 258 (2002) (citing Graham v. Canadian Nat'l. Ry. Co., 749 F. Supp. 1300, 1318
(D. Vt. i99o)).
251. Repp, supra note 9, at 603.
252. Id. The author suggests expert testimony could be used to establish the drift pattern in certain
atmospheric conditions or the defendant's growing practices, noting that circumstantial evidence
alone, however, will make a difficult case for the bystanding farmer. Id. at 604. For an illustration of
the use of expert testimony in airborne pollutant cases, see Stevenson v. E.L DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 327 F.3d 400 (2003).
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 165 (1965). This actual damages requirement applies to
situations in which the invasion of the land is negligent, as in the case of pollen drift. This is opposed to
trespass that involves an intentional invasion of land, which requires no actual damages be proven. See
id. § 163 see, e.g., Brown Jug, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 688 P.2d 932, 938 (Alaska 1984)
(explaining the distinction between intentional and negligent trespass and requirements of each).
254. See Scanlon, supra note 7, at 7-10 (discussing different jurisdictions' approaches to the
requirement of physical versus economic damages).
255. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 797 (Or. 1959) (finding that actual damages
existed where land was rendered unfit for raising livestock).
256. See supra Part II.B (discussing market for non-GMO and organic foods).
257. 380 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
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dropping pesticides that damaged plaintiffs' crops."" The court affirmed a
jury verdict based on trespass, ruling that plaintiff did not have to prove
negligence. Schronk is an authority that could support trespass liability
for GMO defendants, but it may be distinguished on the basis that the
contaminant was released from an aircraft in the airspace over the
crops.259
As an alternative to trespass to land, bystanding farmers might claim
injuries to their crops constitute intentional interference with personal
property. In StarLink Corn Products,6' the plaintiffs pleaded conversion.
The court rejected this claim for two reasons. First, the defendants, in
contaminating the plaintiffs' corn, had not taken possession of the corn
away from the plaintiffs. Second, the contamination had not rendered
the corn valueless. 6 ' The owners had sold their corn, but at reduced
prices in markets where the corn would be devoted to uses other than
human consumption."' In rejecting conversion, the StarLink Corn
Products court said that trespass to chattels (not asserted by the plaintiff)
might be appropriate.
64
D. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO COMBAT POLLEN DRIFT
The phenomenon of pollen drift has led advocates and opponents of
258. Defendants had wanted to spray cotton on other lands. Id. at 744. It is not clear from the
opinion whether the pesticides were discharged accidentally, or whether the pilot intentionally
discharged them due to a mistaken belief that he was over the cotton. Id. at 744-45.
259. The court observed:
Whether the situation is viewed as a wrongful act after rightful entry, or as a trespass ab
initio, is not important. The entry of the fuselage, at even a privileged altitude, was
accompanied by active and continuous spraying of the poisonous substance which
constituted as much a part of the flight as if appellants' aircraft had been dragging a great
scythe across the land below it. In our opinion an actionable trespass was established, and
no allegation of negligence was required.
Id. at 745.
260. 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (2002).
261. Id. at 844.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. Standing crops usually are viewed as real property, not chattels. They become chattels
when severed from the real estate (i.e., harvested). Arguably, plaintiff's standing crops should be
treated as chattels because plaintiff intended to harvest them and sell them as commodities. It is not
likely to matter significantly whether a court proceeds under trespass to chattels, rather than trespass
to land. With respect to the measurement of damages, the analysis is simpler using trespass to chattels.
Plaintiff will want to collect damages equal to the reduced market value on the crop, based on prices in
the commodities markets. This treats the injured property as chattels, not as land. The traditional
measure of damages for trespass to land is the difference in the market value of the land before and
after the trespass. In our context, a court ought to measure damages for trespass to land based upon
the reduced market value of the harvested crops. A court should quickly conclude this is appropriate,
but perhaps some courts might hesitate.
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GMO crops to search for solutions to the growing problem of
contamination. Members of at least two state legislatures have attempted
to pass reform measures that would regulate the use of GMO crops in
those states. For example, in North Carolina, a state in which farmers are
growing approximately three million acres of GMO crops each year, an
attempt was made in 2005 to give the North Carolina Department of
Agriculture the sole authority to regulate and institute bans on GMO
crops. 5' The measure was proposed after several counties in other parts
of the country instituted bans on GMO crops. 66 Certain farm groups and
the state government seek to place control over biotech crops in the
hands of the state government only, making North Carolina a "biotech-
friendly state. ' ,, 67 Opponents of the measure claim that it would protect
no one but Monsanto and similar biotech companies. 68 They cite the
pollen drift phenomenon as a significant reason to be critical of the
state's acceptance of GMO crops.2'6 As of the time this Article went to
press, the bill was still being debated by the North Carolina Senate.
On the other hand, in 2005, Vermont considered the proposed
Farmer Protection Act, which would have effectively held biotech seed
companies liable for damages resulting from pollen drift
contamination.27 Additionally, it would prevent biotech companies from
suing bystanding farmers, those unwilling and unintentional patent
infringers who Monsanto and similar companies currently investigate and
prosecute. 7 ' Similar bills had been proposed and subsequently defeated
in Montana and North Dakota. Although the Vermont legislature passed
the Farmer Protection Act, it was vetoed on May 15, 2005.272
In addition to legislative efforts to control the proliferation of GMO
crops and the problems that accompany them, some biotech companies
have used science to combat the pollen drift problem. For example, in
2005, Hoegemeyer Hybrids developed a new product called
265. H.R. 671, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005); see also David Rice, Senate Panel
Debates Plants-Regulation Bill; Supporters Want to Prevent Some Crop Bans, WINSTON-SALEM J.,
June 22, 2005, at BI.




270. See Andrew Barker, Vermont Plows Ahead on GE Seed Liability Law, VERMONT GUARDIAN,
Mar. is, 2005, available at http://www.mindfully.org/GE/200 5 /Vermont-GE-Seed-
LiabilityI Imar2oo5.htm.
271. Id.
272. The Vermont Legislative Bill Tracking System, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/database/status/
summary.cfm?Bill=S%2Eooi8&Session=2oo6 (last visited Oct. 22, 2o06).
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"PuraMaize," which controls pollen drift by rejecting any pollen that is
not its own ("non-reciprocal pollen cross-sterility").273 By using this seed,
farmers can effectively grow GMO and non-GMO crops side-by-side
without any fear of contamination.2 74 The company received a United
States patent in April 2005275 and currently has patents pending in
countries around the world.76 It will be available commercially
nationwide in 2007.277
Although science may someday develop technology to diminish the
effects of pollen drift, it seems unlikely that state legislatures will be able
adequately to address the problem in the meantime. A legislature might,
acting in what Coase refers to as its capacity as a "super firm, ' 278 correctly
evaluate externalities outside the competence of the common law judge,
for example, the cost of lost biodiversity potentially caused by a rule of
no-liability for pollen drift. If so, a legislature or administrative agency
might be the logical forum to address the problem. We suspect, however,
that for the time being nuisance balancing provides the most effective
tool for considering all the factors relevant to social welfare in the pollen
drift context.
IV. PATENT LAW DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO NoN-GMO FARMERS
Common law is likely to provide a remedy for many farmers harmed
by pollen drift. A bystanding farmer, however, may find himself the
defendant in a lawsuit brought by the owner of the patent in the drifting
pollen. The patent statute provides for strict liability; therefore a
bystanding farmer is prima facie liable for infringement if she
inadvertently makes use of patented pollen or grows a patented hybrid.
Patent law, however, has long recognized a variety of defenses to
infringement. Two existing defenses, unclean hands and patent misuse,
may provide significant relief from patent liability for bystanding
farmers. Two other defenses, the voluntary act doctrine and volenti non
fit injuria, are logically applicable in patent infringement cases but are
not yet judicially recognized in patent litigation. Interestingly, and
consistent with the Coasean analysis conducted in Part I, these defenses
273. See Nebraska Co. Has Developed a Seed That Prevents Cross-Pollination of GMO Crops,
FARMS.COM, July II, 2005, http://www.farms.com/readstory.asp?dtnnewsid=1232303 [hereinafter New
Seed].
274. Id.
275. U.S. Patent No. 6,875,905 (filed Dec. 3, 2001).
276. New Seed, supra note 273.
277. Id.
278. See COASE, supra note 2, at 117.
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are most likely available only to a bystanding farmer, like our organic
farmer, who does not take advantage of the benefits conferred by the
adventitious drift of patented pollen. In other words, an economic
justification can be offered for the application of these doctrines, even
where they seem to test the limits of patent law.
A. INADVERTENT USE OF PATENTED POLLEN AND THE VOLUNTARY
ACT DOCTRINE
Corn plants exercise no independent judgment over the pollen they
use to reproduce. If patented pollen lands on the corn plants of a
bystanding farmer, it will be used. Although other defenses discussed
below279 are applicable to cases of inadvertent pollen uptake, the
voluntary act defense, inapplicable in the contexts of crop harvesting and
selling, helps explain why no patent infringement has occurred when a
bystanding farmer inadvertently grows patented crops.
In criminal law, a voluntary act is an absolute requirement for
criminal liability, even where mental state is irrelevant (as is the case with
patent law liability).8' In most states, for example, statutory rape is a
strict liability crime-that is, lack of knowledge of the victim's age is
typically not a defense. For example, if a thirty-year-old female teacher
has sex with a sixteen-year-old male student, it does not matter if the
teacher could reasonably have thought that the student was above the
age of consent. However, if the teacher is in the hospital for surgery and
the visiting underage student has sex with her when she is still under
anesthesia, the teacher is not guilty of statutory rape. It is not the
teacher's lack of knowledge that forms the basis for the defense, but
rather the involuntary nature of the teacher's partzchpa ion. Cases
applying the doctrine typically excuse reflexive acts or those performed
during sleep."'
The voluntary act doctrine should by analogy excuse a farmer whose
crops are merely the passive receptors of patented pollen, although the
doctrine does not appear by that name in cases excusing civil liability.
The parallel defense to strict liability in civil cases seems to be the "act of
279. See infra Part IV.B.
280. See WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.i(c) (4 th ed. 2003); see also Kevin Saunders, Voluntary
Acts and the Criminal Law: Justifying Culpability Based on the Existence of Volition, 49 U. Prr. L.
REV. 443, 443-44 (1988) ("The concept of the voluntary act lies at the very foundation of the criminal
law, since '[t]here cannot be an act subjecting a person to... criminal liability without volition."'
(quoting Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d, 475, 481 (La. i981))).
281. See LAFAVE, supra note 280, § 6.I(c) ("[I]t is clear that criminal liability requires that the
activity in question be voluntary." (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (1985))).
282. See MODEL PENAL CODE §2.Ot (1985).
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God" doctrine. As explained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, strict
liability (for trespassing livestock, for example) does not extend to
damage "brought about by the unforeseeable operation of a force of
nature (commonly called an 'act of God') or by the unforeseeable action
of another animal or by the unforeseeable intentional, reckless or
negligent conduct of a third person.'283 Accordingly, courts have invoked
the doctrine, for example, as a defense to strict liability in finding that the
owners of reservoirs "'cannot be held liable where the escape of water
has been caused by third party acts which the owner could neither
control nor anticipate.""'' As in criminal law, the lack of volition on the
part of the alleged wrongdoer provides the excuse. If a saboteur blows up
a dam, the reservoir owner is not liable for damage caused to his
neighbor's property by the escaping water.
Similarly, if the livestock of Farmer A rupture the fence of Farmer
B, and Farmer B's livestock enter Farmer A's land and do damage,
Farmer B is excused. These situations are apposite to the pollen drift
context. If the wind blows unwanted pollen onto a bystanding farmer's
fields, then the use of that pollen by the farmer's crops is similarly
without the farmer's volition and should be excused. Note, however, that
neither the voluntary act doctrine nor the act of God defense should be
applicable to a case where the farmer goes further, by harvesting and
selling these unintentionally pollinated crops, or by replanting the seeds
resulting therefrom. Selling and planting are voluntary (and infringing)
acts; accordingly, any excuse for these activities must be found elsewhere.
B. HARVESTING AND SALE OF UNWELCOME PATENTED HYBRIDS
Notwithstanding the strict liability nature of patent infringement, the
harvesting and sale of unwanted hybrid crops by a bystanding farmer
may be excusable. The doctrines discussed below have different
historical roots, but share an abhorrence of a plaintiff who seeks redress
in a situation where she bears primary responsibility for the alleged
wrong.
I. VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
One of the most venerable doctrines in tort law establishes a defense
when the plaintiff voluntarily submits himself to injury. Professor
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 504(3)(c) cmt. i (1965); accord Richard Wright, The
Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1425, 1467-78 (2003) (discussing
superseding causes as a limitation on legal responsibility).
284. Denis Binder, Act of God or Act of Man: A Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort
Law, 15 REV. LITIG. i, 64 (1996) (quoting Albig v. Mun. Auth., 502 A.2d 658, 664 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985)).
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Terrence Ingman traces its history back to Justinian's Code, which states,
"as fraud cannot be committed against anyone who gives his consent, you
will in vain complain of it." ' Put slightly differently, "he who suffers
damage through his own fault has no right to complain of it.
'286
According to Professor Ingman, the defense was well-established in
England by the fourteenth century,"87 and he provides a cogent example
of its operation in 1607.
In Home v. Widlake, the plaintiff sued the defendant for trespassing
on his land and spoiling his grass.288 The defendant pleaded that there
had been a right-of-way over the plaintiff's land which the plaintiff
ploughed up and sowed with wheat."" The court held against the
plaintiff, "for the defendant's plea is a good excuse against the plaintiff,
because the plaintiff did the first tort in stopping the ancient way....
[The trespass] arises from the act and tort of the plaintiff himself, and
volenti non fit Injuria.""
The defense is the historical antecedent to modern tort-like rules
that excuse invitees from trespassing and professional boxers from
committing assault. 9' It is also the origin of the assumption of risk
doctrine.292
The volenti doctrine seems directly applicable to the case of the
bystanding farmer whose plants are pollinated by unwanted patented
GMO pollen. The unwanted hybrid seeds are the result of technology
that the patent owner has literally scattered to the winds, with knowledge
of the most likely consequences. 93 Regardless of whether the behavior of
a patent owner such as Monsanto is characterized as intentional or
reckless with regard to the pollen drift, its own conduct is the primary
cause of the alleged wrong: "[h]e who suffers damage through his own
fault has no right to complain of it."2" And, unlike the voluntary act
doctrine, which requires a defendant to have remained completely
285. Terrence Ingman, A History of the Defence of Volenti Non Fit Injuria, 26 JURID. REV. I, I
(1981) ("nec umquam volenti dolus inferatur, frustra de dol querimini").
286. Id. at 2 ("Quod quis ex culpa suo damnum sentit non intelligitur dannum sentire.").
287. See id. at 2-3.
288. (1607) Yelverton 141, 141-42 (K.B.).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 142.
291. See Ingman, supra note 285, at 4-5.
292. See id. at 8-28. See generally Charles Warren, Volenti Non Fit Injuria in Actions for
Negligence, 8 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1885).
293. We assume the patentee has licensed the invention to a seed manufacturer with knowledge of
the seeds' future manufacture, sale, and use.
294. See Ingman, supra note 285, at 2.
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passive, the defense contains no such requirement. In Home v. Widlake,
the defendant trampled the plaintiff's crops, yet still was excused."5 The
same is true in modern assumption of risk cases. Arguably, therefore, the
crops can be sold. Interestingly, nothing in the doctrine would distinguish
organic from opportunistic farmers.
Finally, it should be admitted that the volenti defense has not yet
been applied in the context of patent infringement. However,
technologies that can force infringement on a passive third party like the
bystanding farmer are creatures of recent vintage. There simply has been
no good reason for its application until now. Employing it in the case of
bystanding farmers would be another in a long line of judicial
adaptations of common law and equitable defenses to suits for patent
infringement. Donald S. Chisum, in his well-known patent law treatise,
lists several familiar non-statutory defenses that have found a
comfortable home in patent suits, including fraudulent procurement,
inequitable conduct, laches, estoppel, bad faith enforcement, and
misuse.29 Volenti non fit injuria should plausibly join the list.
2. Unclean Hands
As the origin of the patent misuse doctrine, the equitable defense of
unclean hands has already found its way into patent law.297 In an
infringement suit by a patent owner against a bystanding farmer, an
injunction preventing the farmer from harvesting or selling his crop is
likely to be a key element of the requested remedy. Equitable relief,
however, is subject to the unclean hands doctrine: "[h]e who comes into
Equity must come with clean hands. '', gs Professor Chafee explains, "[i]n
other words, since equity tries to enforce the good faith of the
defendants, it no less stringently demands the same good faith from the
plaintiffs."2" In his exploration of the defense, he identifies the historical
core function of the defense as protection of a defendant who was
wronged by the behavior of the plaintiff. Although sometimes courts
allow defendants to complain of wrongs done to third parties (rather
than to the defendant), Professor Chafee notes that "much more severity
is shown by law courts to the victims of torts who have themselves been
295. See supra notes 288-290 and accompanying text.
296. See 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 19.03, I9.O3[6], 19.04, 19.05, 19.o6 (i999).
297. See generally Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 269 F.3d, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2OO)
(finding that submission of falsified evidence in litigation barred enforcement of the patent against the
defendant, but did not render the patent invalid against other parties).
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transgressors."3"
In the context of patent infringement claims, any equitable relief
sought by a patentee should have to satisfy the unclean hands standard.
In fact, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit recently
acknowledged in a patent infringement case the doctrine's presence as an
equitable defense: "I believe that as a matter of fundamental principle it
must be a defense to a charge of patent infringement that the patentee
caused the infringement..3 °. In the case before the district court (where
Posner sat by designation), the plaintiff Smithkline held one of several
patents on the blockbuster antidepressant Paxil, and claimed that the
defendant had infringed that patent."2 The district court dismissed the
plaintiff's case, finding that Smithkline's widespread distribution of the
drug had contaminated the defendant's research and production
environments through a process of natural crystallization.3" The
defendant could not help but infringe and was therefore excused from
liability.3" Posner's decision was affirmed by the Federal Circuit on other
grounds,3"5 but the appellate court went on to speak with some approval
of Posner's rationale: "[i]n this unique and unprecedented circumstance,
the trial court understandably reached out to find an equitable remedy to
protect [the defendant]." '
The case of the Paxil defendant and the bystanding farmer fall close
to the historical core of the unclean hands doctrine, where the plaintiff
complaining of the patent infringement is likely to be the same party
primarily responsible for it. Patented seeds are licensed to be sold and
planted, and the production of pollen and process of hybridization are
common knowledge. Inadvertent contamination is a surprise to no one.
Consistent with economic analysis, we would suggest that the defense be
available to farmers harmed by pollen drift, but not by those that benefit.
The unclean hands defense should not be available to an opportunistic
300. Id. at 904-05.
301. Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d bI 1, 1043 (N.D. I11. 2003)
(finding that patent had not been infringed, but that even if it had, equitable defense of unclean hands
would bar plaintiffs recovery).
302. Id. at 1013.
303. See id. at 1019-23, 1051.
304. Id. at 1051.
305. See Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 13o6, 1316-20 (Fed. Cir. 2oo4)
(finding that the drug had been in clinical trials and thus in "public use"). The case was subsequently
affirmed by an en banc opinion, but the conclusion was based on yet another ground- "inherent
anticipation." See Smithkline Beecham v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1341-46 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc).
306. Id. at 1316.
November 2006]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
farmer whose own hands are arguably "unclean."
3. Patent Misuse
The defense of patent misuse, judicially derived from the doctrine of
unclean hands,3" renders a patent unenforceable when the patentee has
engaged in conduct designed to "extend[] the patent beyond its lawful
scope.""' As one court put it, the "rationale of the doctrine is a rejection
of the concept of the patent as an absolute property right in favor of its
definition as a right which must not be exercised in a manner not
inconsistent with the constitutionally-defined purpose for which it was
conferred, i.e., to 'promote the Progress of [the] useful Arts."' 3°
Professor Chisum suggests that the question to ask in patent misuse cases
is whether "the practice in question [should] be treated as an appropriate
exercise of the patentee's statutory patent rights?"'3
In the case of inventors of new plants, patent law provides a means
by which they can attempt to recoup the costs of research and
development. If the new plant constitutes an improvement over prior
similar plants,3"' then the inventor should find a ready market for the
improved good. Patent law provides a legal means to protect that market.
As noted above, Monsanto has patented a corn plant that resists the
herbicide Roundup." 2 Many farmers who use Roundup are eager to buy
the patented "Roundup-Ready" seeds in order to increase their yields.
Patent law gives Monsanto the legal means to assure that it will be the
sole source of Roundup-Ready seeds to farmers wanting to plant them.
307. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-94 (1942) (holding patent
unenforceable and linking patent misuse defense to unclean hands doctrine); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3
Sys., Inc., 157 F.3 d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The defense of patent misuse arises from the
equitable doctrine of unclean hands...."); B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3 d 1419, 1426
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding patent misuse is an extension of the equitable doctrine of unclean hands);
W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 614, 622 (3d Cir. 1976) ("The doctrine of patent
misuse is an extension of the equitable doctrine which denies judicial relief to one who comes into
court with 'unclean hands."').
308. CHIsuM, supra note 296, § 19.04, at 19-427; Katherine E. White, A Rule for Determining When
Patent Misuse Should Be Applied, I I FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ETr. L. J. 671, 673 (2001) ("The
patent misuse doctrine prohibits efforts by a patentee that seek to extend a patent beyond the original
scope of its grant.").
309. Hensley Equip. Co., Inc. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252, 261 (5th Cir. 1967) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8).
310. See CHisuM, supra note 296, § 19.04[2].
311. An invention is patentable whether or not it constitutes an improvement over the prior art (or
has any value at all). See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2005) (establishing novelty, usefulness, and non-
obviousness as prerequisites to obtaining patent).
312. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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Patent law effectively grants Monsanto exclusive rights to this market. 3
Nothing in patent theory, however, suggests that Monsanto should
have the legal right to force unwilling farmers to grow Roundup-Ready
crops against their will. Were Monsanto able to enjoin the harvesting and
sale of all bystanding farmers' crops, Monsanto would be enlarging its
market far beyond what patent law is designed to protect. A bystanding
nori-GMO or organic farmer has no desire to make, use, sell, offer for
sale, or import patented seeds or plants. Given the premium such farmers
receive for selling their non-GMO or organic crops,"4 they vigorously
want nothing to do with such seeds or plants. In other words, bystanding
farmers do not constitute any part of the market that patent law sets
aside for owners of patented pollen, seeds, and plants. A patent
infringement suit against a bystanding farmer constitutes an improper
attempt on the part of the patent owner to expand the scope of the
patent beyond its legal limits-the classic definition of patent misuse.
Consistent with our economic analysis, it should be available to victims
of pollen drift, but not to opportunistic beneficiaries.
The closest analogy in existing law involves cases in which patent
owners have attempted to force liability on unwitting users of technology
through a standard settings process.315 In In re Dell Computer Corp., the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) considered Dell's behavior before the
Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA)."6 In the course of
participating in the VESA standard setting process for a computer bus
design, eventually known as the VL-Bus, Dell certified in writing that it
held no patents, nor planned to hold any patents, that the VL-Bus would
infringe.3"7 Free from concerns that computer firms would have to pay
Dell a royalty in order to conform to the proposed standard, VESA
approved the VL-Bus.3's Once the standard was in place, however, Dell
revealed it held a patent on one key part of the VL-Bus technology."9
Dell's fraudulent representations before VESA threatened to put all
conforming firms in the industry in violation of Dell's patent rights.32 In
order to conform to the standard, Dell's competitors would have to
313. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2005) (detailing rights of patent owners).
314. Seesupra note 7.
315. See Janice Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 623, 631 (2002) (arguing that failure to reveal relevant patent rights in course of standard
setting should constitute patent misuse).
316. 121 F.T.C. 6i6, 617 (i996).
317. Id.
318. See id. at 617, 624.
319. Id. at 617.
320. See id. at 624 n.2.
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infringe or pay Dell a licensing fee.32 ' The FFC found that Dell's
behavior was anticompetitive and that its patent rights provided no legal
excuse for its behavior. 2 As a result, the FTC ordered Dell to license its
patented technology free-of-charge to those wishing to conform to the
VL-Bus standard.3 3
It is every patent owner's dream to see its patented technology
adopted as the sole acceptable industry standard. Where a standard
setting body objectively and with full information adopts a proprietary
standard, the patent misuse doctrine is not implicated. When the patent
owner acts wrongfully, however, in advocating a proprietary standard,
the patent misuse doctrine may render the patent unenforceable against
putative infringers who must conform with the standard.324 In the
standard settings cases,3 3 the key factor is the unilateral imposition of
legal duties on unwitting parties, just as in the case of the patentee and
the bystanding farmer. But the case of the farmer is even more
compelling. Sometimes firms can avoid a standard or design around it,3"6
but the bystanding farmer who discovers that his fields are full of
allegedly infringing plants has been completely captured by the patent
owner. He has no choice but to plow under his fields or pay a licensing
fee.
Some important commentators have expressed doubts about the
defense of patent misuse,3 7 but their complaints are usually directed at
the overlap between the typical patent misuse case and antitrust law."'
The majority of patent misuse cases allege that the patent owner has
used the patent to violate antitrust law, and Professor Mark Lemley's
critique of patent misuse doctrine is representative. He argues that in
321. Id.
322. Id. at 624-25.
323. Id. at 620-21.
324. See Mueller, supra note 315, at 631 (arguing that failure to reveal relevant patent rights in
course of standard setting should constitute patent misuse).
325. See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 318 F.3d io8i, 1084 (Fed. Cit. 2003) (finding that
allegations that advocate for industry standard breached a duty to disclose its pending patent
applications).
326. See Dell, 121 F.T.C. at 618, 619 (order indicates that members delayed implementing the
standard and might have tried to design around it).
327. See, e.g., Patricia Martone & Richard Feustel, Jr., The Patent Misuse Defense-Does It Still
Have Vitality?, 832 PRAC'TSING L. INST. INTELL. PROP. ANITRUST 145, 201-02 (2005).
328. See, e.g., Robin Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 399, 400 (2003) (arguing that patent misuse and antitrust cannot be alleviated by
requiring the application of antitrust rules to test for patent misuse); Mark Lemley, Comment, The
Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1599, 1599 (1990) (arguing that
antritrust laws can serve the same purpose as the patent misuse doctrine.
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antitrust-style cases the misuse "sanction imposed bears no relation to
the injury caused ... [It] duplicates antitrust remedies in many cases,
leading to an excessive level of deterrence ... [and] often pays the
sanction as a windfall to an unrelated third party, thereby encouraging
infringement while failing to compensate those actually injured.""3 9
Although we are sympathetic to the view that the patent misuse doctrine,
to the extent it overlaps with antitrust law, may be "economically
irrational,""33 to use Lemley's term, the bystanding farmer does not come
to court dressed as an antitrust victim.
First, the bystanding farmer who asserts the patent misuse defense
alleges that he is the victim of an illegal nuisance or trespass, not the
victim of an illegal monopoly, so there is no duplication with antitrust
remedies. Second, there is no imbalance between the injury caused to the
farmer and the remedy he seeks. If the misuse defense negates injunctive
relief, the farmer is merely freed to sell his crops at the lower GMO
price. If he also counterclaims for damages, he will only be entitled to the
actual reduction in the value of his crop due to the contamination.33'
There is no double recovery, and the patentee may continue to exploit
and protect his natural market for patented seeds and plants-those who
affirmatively desire to plant them. Finally, there can be no windfall in the
situation where the bystanding farmer has gained no advantage in any
way by the windblown pollen. On the other hand, a bystanding farmer
who takes advantage of the patented technology by either replanting
patented seeds or taking advantage of herbicide resistance qualities of
the patented hybrids should not be able to assert the defense.
Applying the patent misuse defense in the case of the bystanding
farmer would also have the salutary effect of giving some much-needed
content to a neglected half of the typical formulation of the doctrine.
Professor Chisum gives the universally accepted formulation of the
patent misuse defense: "A patent owner may [not] exploit a patent in an
improper manner by violating the antitrust laws or extending the patent
beyond its lawful scope.""33 Courts and commentators have had a hard
time imagining how a patent owner might extend the scope of its patent
in any way other than committing an antitrust-style violation. The
unlawful extension clause in the patent misuse formulation has done
little work. The situation of the bystanding farmer, and perhaps the
329. Lemley, supra note 328, at 16oo.
330. Id. at 1599.
331. See supra notes 253-256 and accompanying text.
332. See CHISUM, supra note 296, § 19.04 (emphasis added).
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victim of a flawed standard setting process, suggest what an unlawful
extension of the patent grant can look like outside the antitrust setting.
Both parties allege wrongs (trespass, nuisance, fraud) that do not require
any finding of an actionable monopolization, while still satisfying the
core equitable concerns underlying the doctrine.
Patent misuse provides the most doctrinally compelling defense for
bystanding farmers who inadvertently commit patent infringement, and it
also suggests a scheme of liability consistent with our economic analysis.
The organic farmer who is harmed by pollen drift presents a strong case
for the application of the patent misuse doctrine. The opportunistic
farmer who intentionally exploits pollen drift presents a much weaker
case.
CONCLUSION
When Ronald Coase wrote The Problem of Social Cost, the
archetypical problems between neighbors that concerned him involved
wandering cows trampling farmer's fields and sparks flying off of trains
to ignite crops. The widespread drift of genetically modified pollen
presents a similar economic problem, but on a much vaster scale that
threatens a multi-billion dollar agricultural industry producing organic
and other non-GMO crops for markets in Japan, Europe, and the United
States. Nonetheless, the simple two-party game modeled by Coase still
provides valuable insights into how pollen drift disputes between
neighbors should be settled. In a world of high transaction costs, nuisance
law can provide an effective mechanism for weighing the costs and
benefits of liability in any particular case. In order to determine the
desirability of imposing liability, a decision-maker must consider the
farming methods at issue, typical crop yields, variable costs of
production, market values of crops, the availability of alternative seeds
and protective measures, and the magnitude of each farmer's switching
costs. In theory, a common law court applying nuisance balancing
doctrines may be better situated to maximize net social welfare than a
state or federal legislature.
The federal legislature, however, has spoken, at least as regards the
patentability of the GMO pollen that may drift unbidden across property
lines. The genetic structure of such pollen is often proprietary, and the
strict liability nature of patent infringement arguably establishes a one-
size-fits-all rule that disadvantages non-GMO farmers at every turn.
Consistent with our economic analysis, we find that equitable doctrines
within patent law provide a defense for a bystanding farmer who has
been harmed by pollen drift, but not for one who has opportunistically
[Vo1. 58:87
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benefited. Coase proved that in a world of high transaction costs, a rule
that fixes liability without regard to variations in the underlying facts is
likely to be inefficient. The nuanced role for patent law that we describe
has support in existing doctrine, is consistent with Coase's discussion of
social cost, and maintains the game theoretic equilibria we establish in
the two-player neighbors pollen drift game.
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